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Abstract: 
The Financial Crisis of 2008 and the ensuing recession created much ambivalence about free 
market economics as a viable way to achieve sustainable economic growth in the United 
States. Despite a robust recovery the downward trend of the American middle class has 
persisted. In 2015 The Obama Administration launched “Middle Class Economics” (MCE) as 
a new set of economic policies that seek to arrest the negative developments and restore 
America as a middle class society. In parallel to MCE the Obama Administration is 
championing an ambitious set of free trade agreements that seeks to include substantial parts 
of Asia and the EU in a trading regime centered on the U.S. The Trans Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are touted as a “managed“ 
form of economic globalization that is more dynamic and socially friendly than the current 
arrangements, and which will benefit the working- and middle class in America.   
 
This thesis looks at the discursive foundations for these policy initiatives, and sees this in 
connection to a broader shift in economic thinking away from free market economics, in order 
to evaluate if we are witnessing a substantive shift in economic thinking away from pure 
market governance towards a more active state that seeks to relieve social hardships through 
economic policy.  
 
For this purpose a combination of discourse analysis DA on textual data from The White 
House, structural analysis of economic institutions, and cultural IPE theory is used. 
 
This thesis suggests that while we are seeing a broadening of the economic debate in the U.S 
to include more non-market elements, these elements are overshadowed by geopolitical 
strategic concerns, represented by the FTAs. Although we are seeing a shift to an economic 
debate that is concerned with the social effects of free market economics, these concerns are 
only recognized insofar as they affect economic performance. Thus we are not seeing a 
democratization of economic policy, but rather a “comeback” of the state in economic 
governance as a more hands-on economic partner in supporting a type of economic 
globalization that is articulated and driven by major corporations. In turn a new type of 
middle class citizen is created that will fit into this new competitive environment.  
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Foreword 
 
After the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing recession, the massive budget deficits, and 
growing economic inequality in the United States conversations have arisen as to the future of 
America as a middle class country, and as the chief underwriter of economic globalization. 
The most dramatic speculations have heralded the utter demise of “capitalism as we know it”. 
This debate has given rise to an entire cottage industry of writers and pundits who are 
proclaiming that we are living in the age of “undead” capitalism where the free market state is 
a “zombie” that runs on default, seemingly unaware that all its life support systems are dead.  
Diverging from these lines of analysis, this thesis attempts to put these developments into a 
more balanced and long-term perspective, arguing instead that what we are seeing is a subtle, 
but yet profound shift in thinking. We are perhaps experiencing the first stage in a 
development that could become a new regional, and perhaps global economic order. 
However, it might be one that is far more ambiguous than expectations of either a 
reinforcement of free market governance or the one hand, or a return to the social liberal 
compromise of the New Deal Coalition on the other.  
In selecting my data I have deliberately avoided focusing on the financial crisis and the 
Recession, because I believe the preoccupation with these events in the mind of pundits have 
blinded them to the gradual nature of change in economic hegemonic discourses, let alone 
institutional development. I wanted not to explain a story of crisis management but a vision of 
the next America going forward, thus, not adding another chapter in the vast literature about 
the malfunctions of the free market economic model.  
 
One of the greatest challenges in writing this thesis was figuring out how all the threads that I 
wanted to explain were connected and how to get them in my theoretical crosshairs without 
trying to explain everything, and thus explain nothing. If choosing such a broad and opaque 
topic constituted hubris and fool-heartedness, I may have added insult to my own injury by 
choosing to describe such recent developments as contemporary. In addition the international 
and domestic nature of economic discourses makes this a project for the academic equivalent 
of Doctors Without Borders. That America Studies gives the physician the multidisciplinary 
tools needed to tell the story has been a source of comfort to the writer.  
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“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, 
both when they are right and when they are wrong, 
are more powerful than is commonly understood. 
Indeed, the world is ruled by little else.” 
-John Maynard Keynes  

1 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 General Introduction 
We are living in interesting times. Starting in the late 1970s, the United States witnessed an 
economic shift in thinking that would transform the institutional and political landscape of the 
U.S in profound ways. The welfare-regulatory state that had been established at great cost 
since the Great Depression was rejected as a defunct idea. The private market assumed was 
increasingly heralded as the solution to America´s woes, and the sluggish government the 
biggest obstacle to the nation´s greatness. In the private market American well-being could be 
maximized and the American Dream materialized. During the three following decades experts 
and elected officials extolled the virtues of the unfettered market. Markets were self-
regulating, efficiency maximizing and inherently benign as a social order.  
Beginning with a housing bubble burst in 2007-8, a protracted economical trauma shook the 
foundations of the free market order. Massive government funds had to plug the bottom of the 
economy, saving Wall Streets proudest and biggest institutions from dragging the American 
economy down into catastrophe. Mountainous debts were exposed, failing banks and 
businesses were nationalized, Social Security faced long-term insolvency. America had gone 
from the world’s biggest creditor to the world’s biggest debtor, now having to ask China to 
absorb more of the U.S bad assets. The state, once considered “the problem”, was now back. 
These developments forced the issue of economic reform, and discredited the intellectual 
edifice of the unbridled market economy 
As economic recovery has been ongoing for six years, and economic growth restored, one 
problem in particular has gotten worse: America´s growing economic inequality. President 
Obamas efforts to address this issue have so far fallen short. Particularly the shrinking 
American middle class has gotten the President concerned. This thesis takes a look at the 
Obama Administration´s latest and most coherent strategy for restoring the American middle 
class: Middle Class Economics (MCE) 1, launched in January 2015.  
As a part of the MCE platform, The Obama Administration is pursuing an ambitious series of 
regional trade agreements that seeks to bring substantial part of Asia and Europe under a U.S-
                                                
1 It should be noted that ”middle-class economics” is a valid description for large parts of President Obamas policies, and as such could be 
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centered free trade regime. The free trade agreements (FTA) TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) 
and TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) is presented to the American 
public as the international component of MCE, and trade policies that will create “values-
driven” type of globalization to replace the non-regulated system that currently exits. The 
FTAs are promoted as a “high standard” regulatory regime that will bring a more socially 
responsible form of economic globalization, conducive to middle class security and 
opportunity. But the past experiences with free trade has not been beneficial to the middle 
class, which makes the ambitions of these policies seem at odds with each other. And so far 
the Obama Administration has gone out of its way to negotiate these trade deals away from 
the prying eyes of democratic institutions.  
There is no macroeconomic theory that is not at the same time a political philosophy. Thus, 
when President Obama explicitly launched his MCE program, he offered what he saw as a 
new political and moral vision for the future of the United States. Presented as a coherent 
economic plan to save the American middle class, MCE aims to provide economic security 
and restore opportunity for working Americans. However, in combination with free trade 
initiatives that claims to adhere to these same values. Although MCE does not directly 
challenge the workings of the free market and the structures that underpin it, MCE, could 
represent a partial abandonment of free market governance principles. The degree to which 
this might be the case is the object of this thesis. If the U.S government is “back”, which these 
very ambitious policies suggest, whom is the government serving? And how does Obama see 
the government’s role in the post-crisis America? Are we witnessing a democratization of 
economic policy?  
 
1.2. Research Questions:  
Through analyzing materials material on MCE and the FTAs released from The White House, 
I will to unearth their discursive foundations in relation to free market and welfare liberal 
discourses. Particular attention is paid to the component of discourse that seeks to fuse 
international ambitions of trade liberalization with domestic ambitions of promoting new 
middle class security. If adopted as intended, the TPP and TTIP will become an economic 
regime that covers most of the western world and substantial parts of Asia under the economic 
aegis of the USA. How does the Obama Administration legitimize free trade agreements in a 
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period when “free market” policies and economic liberalization is intellectually and morally 
drawn into question? And how are these free trade initiatives fused with middle class 
economics?  
Thus I have formulated the following questions that seeks to explore the anatomy of MCE: 
• How is the tension resolved between pursuing a free trade agreement and 
simultaneously championing an economic program that aims to benefit the middle 
class?  
• Does Middle Class Economics challenge free market modes of governance, or 
reinforce aspects of it? I.e., how does it conceive of the relationship between the state 
and the citizen? 
• How does the Obama Administration construct a “new citizen” that is congruent with 
the new economic vision for America. Is the role of the state now to make its subjects 
more attractive to transnational corporations, or to protect its subjects from corporate 
abuse?  
• How is MCE and the FTAs communicated to the public as a coherent policy? 
 
1.3 The Decline of the American Middle Class 
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, debates about economic inequality in America have 
reached crescendo levels. Rapidly growing economic inequality and the adverse effects this is 
seen to have on social mobility has been elevated to the chief concern of President Obama, 
who is identifying these developments as the “defining challenge of our time.”2 These fears 
are justified, though, as Oxfam in 2015 reported the wealth owned by the top 0.1% of 
Americans now is almost equal to the bottom 90% of the population. Also the top 20% of 
American households own 84% of America´s wealth, while the bottom 40% combine to own 
only 0,3 % revealing that large segments of the American population barely own anything.3 
Combined these numbers have the U.S the most unequal of all “advanced” democracies, 
despite being the richest in aggregated terms. The slice of national income going to the top 
                                                
2 “Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility” (The White House) 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economic-mobility Accessed Nov 01, 2015 
3 “The Asset Price Meltdown and the Wealth of the Middle Class” (National Bureau of Economic Research) 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18559 Accessed Nov 01, 2015 
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0.1% is higher now in 2015 than the peak years of the Gilded Age.4 Although, growth is back 
in the American economy, it has not reached the middle and bottom strata of American 
society. As such, the recovery of the crisis rather than the crisis itself has revealed the 
shortcomings of the unfettered market in obtaining a sustainable and growing economy.  
The weakening of the American middle-class has been a gradual development over the 
last three decades. The end result has been stagnant median wages and rising costs of living 
for the majority of American households. Especially housing and education, which constitute 
the chief sources of physical and human capital of the middle class, has risen much faster than 
inflation. Alan Krueger, chairman of the Board of Economic Advisers to the President, 
defines the middleclass in economic terms as the group of people that are plus or minus (+/-) 
50% of the average median income in America.5 In 1979 just over 50% of American 
household met this definition in America. In 2012, this figure was 42%, amounting to a 
transfer of wealth to the tune of 1.1 trillion dollars annually to the top 1%. In sociological 
terms we can define the middle class in line with the Obama Administration´s own 
vernacular: The class of Americans enjoying a comfortable standard of living, with economic 
security, where work is derived from skills – most commonly from higher education.  
Many explanations have been proffered to explain the shrinking American middle 
class. Prominent economists like Thomas Piketty, Joseph Stieglitz, Paul Krugman and others 
have argued that the free market economics and the lack of active economic policies in the 
U.S have caused this development. They argue that the natural tendency of the unfettered 
market is movement towards greater inequality, and that the middle class was created in 
America by conscious political decision.6 The White House is attributing the shrinking middle 
class to a combination of technological change and political decisions that have produced an 
economic system that have eroded the underlying foundations that the underpinned the middle 
class. These have been decline in unionization, skill-biased technological change, increased 
international competition, rising costs of services.  
As the negative effects of inequality loom ever larger on the political scene, American 
politicians of all stripes are under pressure to address this issue. This combined with the 
success with which other countries have moderated economic inequality by active 
government policy, makes Americans increasingly aware that the American economic model 
                                                
4 “America is the richest, and most unequal, country” (Fortune Comments) 
http://fortune.com/2015/09/30/america-wealth-inequality/ Accessed Nov 01, 2015 
5 Alan B. Krueger, “The Rise and Consequences of Inequality in the United States”, Council of Economic Advisers Papers (2012), 2 
6 See: Paul Krugman. ”How to save the middle class form extinction” Alternet.org (2007) 
http://www.alternet.org/story/48988/how_to_save_the_middle_class_from_extinction Accessed Nov 02, 2015; Thomas Piketty, Capital in 
the Twenty-First Century, (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2013) 
5 
 
of free market economics – once considered an object of emulation – now is the most 
economically unequal of all advanced OECD countries.7 This coupled with the fact that 
economic inequality is connected to less social mobility means that the very cornerstone of 
American nationhood: the American Dream is increasingly becoming a myth. In America, 40 
percent of children born in poverty will remain poor.8 In no advanced democratic country is 
your parents’ income as good a predictor of your own income as the United States.  
Free market ideology and the myths that have supported it have increasingly come 
under scrutiny by and increasingly vocal and emboldened group of intellectuals, economists, 
politicians and others. The inability of free market advocates to mount a credible defense in 
light of the mounting material evidence for the shortcomings of their model has relegated 
many of the free market advocates to the defensive. The economic debate in the U.S has 
widened after the financial crisis.  
The American middle class is not only a prime target group of political courtship, but 
also a symbol of America as a moral society. The middle-class is both an American invention 
and the embodiment of the American Dream. Thus, the middle class can be considered the 
foremost carrier of American national identity and the health of the middle-class is what 
secures America pride of place amongst other “advanced” societies. Fears of “American 
decline” – a powerful discourse in present American politics, have thus been linked to the fate 
of the middle class. In American culture, economic inequality per se is much more culturally 
accepted than in parts of Europe, for example. Thus, the critique that is directed towards the 
free market advocates in the U.S today is one that is centered on “fairness” – fundamentally 
moral critique.  
These developments have forced U.S policymakers and pundits of all stripes to engage 
in a debate about the assumptions of the U.S economic model and the ability of the market 
alone to solve these problems. The legitimacy and validity of free market economic thinking 
has suffered tremendous challenges in mounting a coherent and legitimate defense for the 
declining middle class. As economists, pundits, politicians and the public have become 
increasingly vocal in their protest of the “oligarchical” tendencies in the American economy, 
the very structure of the U.S’ economy are drawn into question. Talk of economic 
redistribution, the “1%”, progressive taxation has abounded in American politics to New Deal 
era levels.  
 
                                                
7 OECD Webpage http://www.oecd.org/social/inequality.htm Accessed September 28, 2015  
8 Ibid.  
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1.4 Middle Class Economics 
 
Middle Class Economics is a range of policies that aim to arrest the downward trend of the 
American middle class. The 2015 Economic Report to the President states that: “The ultimate 
test of an economy’s performance is the well-being of its middle class.”9 MCE thus aims to 
address the distribution of economic growth in America, since the American economy is 
currently in a phase of sustained growth, but this growth is currently flowing to the top 
income brackets. MCE takes a broad structural view of the American economy to identify the 
social causes the declining middle class. Income inequality is thus only a part of the total 
picture of middle class decline. The ambition of MCE is to move America in the direction of a 
more socially friendly economy. Taken together, MCE departs from free market economics in 
that the American government has to be a more hands-on actor in the economy.  
The Obama Administration identifies three structural problems that it sees as the key to 
helping the middle class: 
• Grow productivity. 
• Combat income inequality. 
• Increase labor force participation. (Percentage of working-age population in full time 
jobs)  
The President’s economic advisers conclude that the American economy is performing sub-
optimally. In fact, the 2015 Report calculates that if the American economy had continued its 
positive trend from the mid-seventies in respect to these three aspects, the median income for 
U.S households would be double what they are today, adding another 51,000 dollars to the 
average family.10 The solution to these problems as presented in MCE can be summarized as 
containing four areas of policy:  
• Raising wages for American workers. Increasing the political power of unions. 
• Further developing the U.S as a “knowledge” economy. Through more affordable 
education and job retraining.  
• Increasing the scope and quality of social security programs. Increase labor force 
participation by enacting more family-friendly work policies like paid maternity leave, 
guaranteed state-paid sick leave and daycare, and other welfare initiatives to help 
families combine family life and work flexibility.  
                                                
9 ”2015 Economic Report to the President”, p.29 
10 Ibid.p.33 
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• Increasing the competitiveness of the American economy.11 Relates to the above 
policies, but the aim is to attract international companies by simplification of tax- and 
business regulations, and reductions in the effective tax rate paid by corporations. This 
latter point is believed possible by closing loopholes and stopping leakage abroad as a 
result of companies’ use of “tax planning strategies” (tax havens).  
 
TTP and TTIP, presented as part of the package, are seen as measures to boost the American 
economy and compatible with middle class economic security since they are both dynamic 
and fair. From the 2015 Economic Report: 
[…] bilateral trade agreements can reduce the likelihood of bilateral conflict, as economic cooperation promotes 
political cooperation, though the relationship is less clear in a multilateral setting, perhaps because multilateral 
trade reduces the dependence of any one country on another. Trade can also facilitate the spread of new green 
technologies throughout the world, which decreases emissions, potentially outweighing any additional emissions 
associated with an increased scale of production, consumption, and transportation.12 
 
President Obama stated in his 2015 State of the Union Address, that the “new trade 
partnerships” would “create more jobs”.13 The FTAs are expected to boost the American 
economy and create more good paying jobs for American workers, as export industries 
generally pay higher wages than do non-export ones. However, many are still unconvinced by 
the Presidents reassurances, as the FTAs have only been able to garner support from 49% of 
the American population, according to a study by Pew Research.14 Therefore a task of the 
Obama Administration as the sponsor of the deals is to present them as beneficial for the 
American middle- and working class.15 
However, trade agreements tend to create new winners and losers. Who are the winners 
in this new round of agreements? The driving question for this thesis is the appearance of a 
contradiction between pursuing new trade agreements at the same time as wanting to protect 
the American middle class. This means that the economic regime that is created must be 
coherent both domestically and transnationally to resolve the tensions between these contexts 
– a task that free market advocates never attempted, as markets were inherently beneficial and 
                                                
11 2015 Economic Report to the President. pp.5 
12 Ibid. 292 
1313 Barack Obama, 2015 State of the Union Address, paragraph 23 
14 Americans favor TPP, but less than those in other countries do (Pew Research Center RSS), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/06/23/americans-favor-tpp-but-less-than-other-countries-do/ 
15 The first concern is the TPP, which is further along in the process of completion than its transatlantic counterpart. This will be discussed 
further in chapter four.   
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universal as in “one size fits all”. In order for MCE to resolve these tensions, Obama must 
develop a political economy that is explicit and self-reflexive around its social goals. This 
opens up the question of what constitutes legitimacy in post crisis America. 
As the U.S is faring better than its developed world counter-parts in terms of relative 
growth after the crisis, President Obama has the chance to more freely design a new economic 
path. In terms of the pressures in the competitive global economy, the modest recovery of the 
U.S constitutes political leeway for Obama to address the institutional aspects of the 
American economy from a position of strength, as the introduction of FTAs, and the policy 
prescriptions in MCE demonstrate. Both in rhetoric and content, then, the Obama 
Administration is signaling the need for a clear strategic redesign the American economy. 
President Obama himself describes the ambitions: “Over the past six years, America has risen 
from recession freer to write our own future than any other nation on Earth. A new foundation 
is laid. A new future is ready to be written.”16  
 
1.5 Free Market Capitalism in the USA 
 
In order to analyze the discourses that provide the foundation for MCE, one must consider the 
broader social context in which these policies are formulated. Throughout this thesis the term 
free market capitalism will be used. A key analytical concept in this thesis is “free market 
capitalism” or “free market policies”. The concept of free market capitalism has been closely 
associated with the much-used term “neoliberalism”. Although the two terms are used 
interchangeably, this thesis avoids the term “neoliberalism” term for a number of reasons. 
First, neoliberalism, in its current usages, is a very broad term frequently invoked to describe 
everything from global to local developments, and can almost be considered a universal 
description for “capitalism” – as in classical Marxism. The term has been used to describe 
anything and everything (usually as a denunciatory category) consequently; its analytical 
value has greatly diminished. Second, the term neoliberalism is rarely used to describe 
developments inside the USA, mostly for the reasons above. The term is mostly associated 
with international developments, and the focus of this thesis is predominantly the domestic 
level of analysis.17 Third, the “neo” in neoliberalism obscures the fact that the core principles 
are nothing new in American political economic history and does not constitute a substantive 
                                                
16 ”2015 Economic Report to the President”, Council of Economic Advisers, p.5 
17 Terry Flew. ”Six Theories of Neoliberalism” (Queensland University of Technology, Thesis Eleven, June 2014) 122: 49-71, 54 
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evolution from economic liberalism´s earlier form. Indeed, free market capitalism has a long 
lineage in American society, and its central principle of hostility towards “big government” 
can be traced back to classical political liberalism of the eighteenth century.18 Thus this thesis 
will use “free market economics” or “free market policies”.  
 
As a discursive formation, free market economics can be described as a non-static and non-
uniform set of principles, values and practices which find idiosyncratic expressions in 
different historical and social circumstances.19 Core elements of free market economics in the 
USA have been; hostility towards government regulation in the economy; free market 
economic philosophy that emphasizes low taxes and tariffs to give maximum scope to market 
mechanisms; skepticism of welfare and social policy by the state, as this is seen to create 
welfare dependency and dampen entrepreneurial spirit; emphasizes the individual as the basic 
unit in society, and individual initiative as central to value creation; a moral conservatism and 
an emphasis on nationalism.2021 Free market advocates’ antagonistic relationship with the 
welfare state has been defined by Andrew Gamble:   
 
[Free market economics holds that] as many costs as possible should be shifted from the state and 
back on to individuals, and markets, particularly labour markets, should be made as flexible as 
possible...The presumption is always in favour of recreating the widest possible conditions for 
markets to flourish, which means removing as many restrictions on competition as possible, and 
empowering market agents by reducing the burdens of taxation.22 
 
Typically according to free market advocates, the legitimate functions of the state are: Protect 
and preserve stability in property rights; uphold the law and provide domestic order; secure 
the nation against foreign threats.23 Outside this framework the state should not venture. This 
will interfere with the workings of the market, which is the supreme social organizing 
principle of free market societies.  
Theoretically, free market economics are based on “new classical” economic theory, 
which have emphasizes microeconomic insights like of rational choice theory, and market 
efficiency to macroeconomics.24 This theory has provided scientific support for the market as 
                                                
18 This will be discussed further in chapter three.  
19 Sean Hosking, ”The Aspirational Citizen and Neo-liberal Hegemony: A Discourse Theory Analysis”, Ph.D Thesis, (Faculty of Arts & 
Social Sciences, UNSW, 2011), 64. 
20Sean Hosking, ”The Aspirational Citizen and Neo-liberal Hegemony, 64. 
21 David Harvey, A Brief history of Neoliberalism. (Oxford University Press, London, 2007), 9 
22 Andrew Gamble, Neo-liberalism. Capital & Class 25:107, (2001), 132 
23 Marc Allen Eisner, The American Political Economy. (Routledge, New York, 2011), 9 
24 Flew. ”Six Theories of Neoliberalism”, 54 
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the natural organizational principle of any social order, and the ineptitude of intervention in 
markets by the state or any other non-commercial actors. Markets are here seen as benign in 
their social outcomes and therefore political intervention is distorting price signals and 
optimal distribution, thus producing sub-optimal outcomes. Markets are also universal in their 
application, so that the spatial proliferation of market institutions is seen as a natural process 
of harmonization and modernization. By David Harvey: 
 
If markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or 
environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond 
these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be 
kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess 
enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest 
groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for 
their own benefit.25 
 
Out of the many competing ideas on what America should be, the economic imaginary of the 
free market has been particularly attractive. Free market policies popularity after the 1970s 
can be traced to their increased political movement arising as a protest against the 1930s New 
Deal coalition and the postwar Keynesian welfare state, in the series of economic crises in the 
1970s. Since the political resurgence of free market liberalism in the 1980s under President 
Reagan, these policies have been most commonly associated with the political Right in 
America. However, support for the free market economics can be found across the political 
spectrum among various groups.  
For its critics, the free market economics has been seen to move politics out of the 
purview of economic processes, thus disabling the state to mitigate the negative effects of 
markets. Opponents of free markets, widely ranging from Keynesian welfare liberalists to 
Marxists, have been concerned with the adverse social and institutional effects of unbridled 
markets. Particularly, the developments of economic inequality in America have been 
attributed to a lack of government regulation and provision of welfare. Thus those who 
oppose free market policies have turned to the state to curtail these developments.  
Frustrations over the U.S governments lack of ability or will to curtail the negative 
workings of the market have been the focus of more moderate free market critics. Politicians 
who are deferring to the private and market have added to the frustrations. Thus many feel 
that modern politics has lost sight of political economy, supporting a view that the global 
economy is beyond state control and that political institutions are either mere servants of the 
                                                
25 Harvey, A Brief history of Neoliberalism, 6 
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global economy or powerless to resist its economic pressures. In connection to the recent 
debates about economic inequality and the shrinking middle class, the structural aspects of 
economic growth have been more explicitly focused on in economic debates. Here MCE 
comes in as a sign that faith in free markets may be inconsistent in the long term with core 
American values.  
 
1.6 The U.S’ Autonomy in Global Capitalism  
Since this thesis is concerned with international FTAs and the autonomy of the Obama 
Administration to design national economic policies, there need to be some concept about the 
role of the U.S state in relation to the global capitalist system. Economic globalization is for 
the purposes of this thesis understood as the combined effect of “technological, economic, and 
political innovations that reduce barriers to economic, political and cultural exchange”, citing 
renowned IPE scholar Daniel Drezner.26 A common conception that has arisen in the U.S 
together with the celebrating of the unbridled market is that the state is beholden to the 
transnational financial markets and that the sate has surrendered its powers over the economy. 
Susan Strange noted this development early in her 1996 book The Retreat of the State, where 
she held that as a consequence of the free market policies and economic liberalization of the 
late seventies and early eighties, a form of economic governance where markets were 
displacing states had come into being.27 Echoing this conclusion, critics of economic 
globalization have focused on the universal logic of the international financial architecture 
and the general tendency of convergence on economic policy that this structure has produced. 
Thus, states have little influence over global capital. There is much truth in these claims, but 
they underestimate the power of states. 
Central in the power transition away from the state has been the spatial fragmentation 
of production processes. This phenomenon, associated with the term “post-Fordism” has been 
one of the defining characteristics of economic globalization. Whereas Fordism traditionally 
has been used to describe a system of mass production of one single good at one location, 
post-Fordism describes the transnational production chain. The increased trans-nationalization 
corporations and the eroding of national allegiances of corporations that undermine national 
legislation have presented challenges for governments in creating economic policies against 
                                                
26 Drezner, Daniel W. (2005) ”Globalization, harmonization, and competition: the different pathways to policy convergence.” Journal of 
European Public Policy, 12:5, 841-59, pp.841 
27Susan Strange. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press, (1996). 
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these interests.28 Private corporations are increasingly “restless” and can play governments off 
each other in order to gain the most favorable regulatory environment. In the eyes of its 
critics, this structural dynamic is the chief cause of the erosion of the middle class by 
undermining the power of labor unions and creating a “race to the bottom” dynamic. Those 
who have been threatened by these developments have prompted many to want the state to 
protect the American workers from this dynamic. Under the postwar Bretton Woods regime, 
the curtailing of international capital was seen as necessary to ensure the U.S and other 
governments the leeway to shape national politics according to social goals. Thus, the FTAs 
that the Obama Administration is pursuing have been met with great suspicion, as trade 
liberalization has been attacked as a prime cause of the declining middle class historically in 
the USA. There exists tensions between the international capitalist system and the need for 
national autonomy, but these tensions can be ameliorated with government regulation, and 
this is the ambition of MCE, which we return to in chapter 5.  
However, in the world after the financial crisis we have seen indications of a reversal 
of this trend.29 After all, when considering the Nordic countries, Germany, China, France, we 
see that there are more than one way to “deal with” economic globalization. These 
idiosyncrasies tell us that there is room for different state strategies in capitalist development. 
Theoretically this is especially the case for the U.S, which is the mightiest nation on earth in 
economic terms. According to renowned IPE scholar Daniel Drezner, power, in the global 
economy, comes from having large internal markets: “A great power has an economy of 
sufficient size and diversity such that it acts as a natural attractor for profit-seeking actors 
while being able to rebuff potential coercers. Great powers are price-makers, not price-takers 
– they have ‘go-it-alone’ power.”30 The United States’ support for globalization has been 
crucial in the shaping of the global economy, and an open global economy has reflected 
American domestic political interests and its hegemonic position in global affairs.31   
This implies that there is, contrary to the Universalist line of thinking on the global 
economy, room for the U.S to maneuver in economic policy. Theoretically speaking then, 
there is insurmountable structural barrier that prevents the U.S from pursuing economic 
policies that go against global capital. Domestically, though, there the picture can arguably be 
different.  
                                                
28 Marc Allen Eisner, The American Political Economy. (Routledge, New York, 2011), 9 
29 Eisner, The American Political Economy, 9 
30 Drezner,”Globalization, harmonization, and competition: the different pathways to policy convergence.” pp.843 
31 Eric Helleiner. States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
(1994), 15 
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In some aspects, the USA is facing one of the same dilemmas that was the raison d´etre 
for the Bretton Woods agreements: How to create an international liberal trade regime, while 
at the same time retaining national and local autonomy? How to get most the benefits, but few 
of the drawbacks of globalization? As John Gerard Ruggie commented on international 
economic regimes: they do not just reflect power relationships, they reflect values and 
cultures. Thus the particular values and political ideas that international trade regimes emerge 
out of will be reflected in the regime. As international institutions are snapshots of the 
conditions, values, power-relationships that created them, the discourses that go into the 
creation of MCE can become hugely important in shaping the economic globalization of the 
future.  
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
 
After this introductory section, chapter 2 addressees the methodological aspects of the thesis. I 
define discourse, state my theoretical and methodological approaches, and present the scope of 
discourse analysis as the study of language in social research. Following this is a presentation of 
my methodological approach and my data selection. Thereafter is a short outline of the most 
important secondary sources that provide the theoretical inputs that the study has drawn upon. 
Chapter 3 is a straight historical narrative, where I analyze the structural aspects of economic 
institutions in the USA from the start of the free market thinking as an economic outgrowth of 
political liberalism up until the events of 2008; the financial crisis and the election of Barack 
Obama. Chapter 4 picks up where chapter three left off, and offers a take on the recent situation 
in the U.S that will lay premises for analysis in chapter 5. Also here, I outline the FTAs and 
their geopolitical significance for the U.S. Chapter 5 consists of discourse analysis of the data 
selected from the White House. This chapter is organized according to my four research 
questions as stated in chapter 1: How MCE is communicated to the public; How MCE is shaped 
as a part of the TPP and TTIP free trade agreements; How MCE conceptualizes citizenship; and 
finally, how MCE communicates a specific view of the new “model American”. Finally, in 
chapter 6, I summarize my findings and connect these to the thesis questions.  
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Chapter 2 – Methods 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the different methods availed in the thesis. I first explain 
how I approach discourse analysis, then I explain the other method used where I analyze the 
dialectics of culture and institutions in of American political economy.   
 
2.1 Theoretical Foundations of Discourse Analysis  
As this thesis relies on discourse analysis to analyze the textual data released from The White 
House, it is important to define what is meant by discourse and how thesis thesis goes about 
analyzing it. Discourse is a term used to identify “webs” of meaning located within a 
historical and social context that represents, interprets and in turn reproduces material and 
social reality. Thus broadly speaking we can say that discourses are “a particular way of 
talking about or understanding the world”.32 Discourses can be seen as a process of 
constructing semiosis, which includes all forms of communicative meaning, like for example 
body language, textual language, architecture, symbols, etc. Consequently semiosis is 
something that comes into being when it is interpreted by another human being, thus semiosis 
is dialectically related between social elements. Norman Fairclough describes the following 
elements as relating to the construction of discourse through social practice: Productive 
activity, means of production, social relations, social identities, cultural values, consciousness, 
semiosis (language). These elements are in a dialectical relationship with each other, and 
cannot be separated in a meaningful way. DA as an analytical approach aims to look at 
language and see how semiosis relates to these other elements.33 
Discourse as an analytical concept, becomes fruitful when crystallizing patterns of 
semiosis occur and play out over time or between different social spheres.34 Therefore 
discourse analysis (DA) is located in the field of social constructivism. This thesis deals with 
an analysis of discourse mediated though texts. Also, it rests to a large extent on the 
theoretical framework of Critical Discourse Analysis. However, it does not adhere to the 
specific three-staged method developed by Norman Fairclough.  
 
                                                
32 M. Jørgensen & L.J. Phillips, Discourse analysis as theory and Method (London: SAGE, 2002), 1 
33 Norman Fairclough, and Isabela Fairclough. Political Discourse Analysis. New York: Routledge, (2012), 107 
34 Ibid.  
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The general epistemological position on DA is that the way we talk about the world will 
reflect our understanding of it, and can never be more than “claims” on truth. We must 
therefore talk about truths in the plural. Language and context are constantly changing in 
relation to each other in a fluid relationship. Binaries such as “natural” vs. “un-natural”, “fair” 
vs. “unjust” etc. can never be seen as fixed, but must be seen in relation to culture and 
legitimacy. When we communicate we are, consciously or not, challenging or reinforcing 
discourses in a process of meaning making. This process will lead to different courses of 
action being taken, and as such have material consequences. Texts can in this sense be 
productive in a Foucaultian sense. Discourse in general is both socially constitutive and 
constituted.35  
That being said, a central point of divergence in the theoretical foundation of different 
approaches to DA, is these epistemological and ontological premises that regard the role of 
language in the material world. In other words the different schools of DA differ as to the 
degree in which language can in fact represent or change the construction of the material 
world. CDA is rooted in the post-structuralism of Michel Foucault, Slavoj Zizek and Gilles 
Deleuze and others, which understands meaning as normative and socially constructed to a 
large extent, but as opposed to Discourse Theory (DT), CDA reserves a bigger role for non-
discursive elements, whereas DT tends to see the entire social realm as discursively 
constructed. For Fairclough, DT overemphasizes the ability of structurally marginalized 
groups to challenge discourse hegemony. Some social groups do not have access to discourses 
on the basis of class, gender or race, for example.36 
The theoretical assumption of this thesis is derived from CDA, as the importance of 
structural and political-institutional aspects of both the U.S domestic and international 
economic factors is seen to provide important material and cultural premises for action, and 
thus limiting the role of discourses in bringing about change by themselves. This perspective 
is necessary to understand President Obama´s position as a politician hoping to bring about 
practical change under structural limitations. Politics - famously the art of the “possible” - is 
different for an incumbent President that for someone in opposition. Although there 
theoretically considerable leeway for Obama to shape economic policy in the USA currently, 
he is still beholden to structural limitations internationally and domestically. Discourses do 
not only reveal structural power, but can also mask such powers by operating independently 
of real power, or by creating the illusion of power (as is a tendency in political discourse).  
                                                
35 Jørgensen, Discourse analysis as theory and Method, 1 
36 Ibid.1-2 
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In addition to presenting his own policies, Obama´s role is to persuade and to provide 
people with the reasons for acting in a certain way. The way President Obama speaks about 
America will not only affect the way Americans make sense of reality, but will also seek to 
reinforce or alter certain kinds of social behavior, as discourse can shape the subjects 
understanding of material reality. In political discourse it is important to note that discourses 
are not only a way to describe social reality as it is but also used to construct a version of the 
world as it should be.37 
As Americas ultimate elected official of President Obama is both a product of this 
culture, but its chief articulator and driver. As the President, Obama´s use of language can be 
a powerful account of what is “acceptable”, or conventional wisdom. As President of the 
United States and a gifted orator, President Obama is in a powerful position to shape 
discourse. His speech represents a represents “officialdom” and gravitas, which gives his 
version of reality very real influence. President Obama´s rhetoric thus serves as a convenient 
measure of the discursive power relation between the free market centered economic 
discourses and the legitimacy of the government, represented by Obama, to intervene in the 
market economy.38  
Also, the “critical” component in CDA is a premise in my methodology. Thus I am not 
only analyzing the discourse from the White House to describe its policies in relation to free 
market discourses, but I also want to evaluate them in terms of their devotion to the particular 
goal of structurally addressing economic inequality in the U.S and relieving middle class 
hardship.  
For the purposes of looking at the data selected form the White House, I have followed a 
three-pronged approach to the selected material as recommended by Fairclough: First, I do a 
general analysis of the texts where I look to what discourses are present whether they support of 
challenge my thesis. The task is to systemize and prioritize these into patterns that make 
discourses stand out. Then I evaluate the communicative nature of these discourses.   
Second, I consider at the discursive practices that surround the creation of the text. As this 
thesis deals with two main types of sources, political discourse and economic technical discourse, 
the treatment of these two types must be different since they vary in in their respective audiences 
and how meaning is produced, and the function of the texts. Political discourse from an 
incumbent president tends to be more practical and seeks to garner public support for a set of 
concrete policies, while the Economic Reports to the President are economic technical jargon that 
                                                
37	  Norman	  Fairclough,	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  Fairclough.	  Political	  Discourse	  Analysis.	  103 
38 This point will be discussed further in chapter 4 
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contains an economist’s view of the American economy to the President. The aim is to discover 
how the texts interact in social reality, i.e. their instrumentality. 
Third, the broader social context in which MCE is a response to is considered. The 
broader context considered in this thesis is the post financial crisis U.S and the narratives that 
have arisen from this event and the subsequent negative developments. A part of the post 
financial crisis narratives (but not excluded to this development) is the more broadly applied 
“American decline” narrative. The “decline” narrative has tended to find expressions in 
periods of American history, where U.S sees its dominance or identity challenged, either by 
external of internal factors.39 But recently this narrative has been a consistent theme of 
American politics. Many of the reasons for this arose under the presidency of George W. 
Bush, and a public sense of mismanagement of the nations affairs during this period. The 
unchecked rise of China, outcompeting the U.S in the global economy; mishandled wars in 
the Middle East; American troops responsible for human rights violations; America as the 
worlds biggest debtor, etc – all are part of the picture of “American decline” in addition to the 
financial crisis and the great recession. Thus, MCE is not just a return to more sound 
economical policies, but is part of a broader moral re-orientation of America as President 
Obama sees it.  
I have started by locating the texts that are the most publically visible, in terms of 
viewer rating and availability. This is what has lead to the priority of the selected material. 
One discovery that is quickly made is the consistency in the President´s rhetoric. The 
arguments, narratives, motives, signs, and examples put forth are subtle variations on a single 
theme, and thus add to the impression that the presidents use of discourse is strategic. This is 
hardly a surprise, given the professionalization of speech writing in high politics, but is has 
the added benefit of tidiness for analytical purposes. Therefore this thesis is focusing more in 
detail on a concentrated set of data, as it is assumed that the formulations are tested on focus 
groups over and over to find the most effective language, and, as such, the discursive choices 
are unlikely to change short of a dramatic change in circumstance.  
 
2.2 Key Analytical Concepts and Terminology 
This thesis avail itself on the analytical terminology developed by Ernest Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe in relation to Discourse Theory. This terminology is widely used in other discourse 
                                                
39 For example, the economic rise of Japan and other ”tiger” economies were widely interpreted as a sign of American decline in the 1990s. 
See, for example: Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. 
New York, NY: Random House, 1987. 
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analysis approaches, including Fairclough´s Critical Discourse Aanalysis. The concept of 
antagonism represents a conflict between discourses that have opposition meanings. The 
notion of a sign or signifier denotes a particular meaning to a word at the expense of 
alternative discourses. Thus signs are important as sites of contestation. When a sign is 
ambiguous in terms of lending itself to different discourses, I will be using the term fluid 
sign.40 The different discourses are thus competing to attach a definitive connotation to a fluid 
sign. If successful, the sign has now been re-contextualized.  
Another key concept drawn from this terminology is the idea of a nodes, and nodal 
points. A nodal point is a place in the text from which a discourse seeks to establish a web of 
meaning. This usually starts from a privileged signifier from which the connected words 
derive their meaning. Nodal points can also function as empty signifiers which can be 
attributed multiple meanings. This category can serve as to invite the receiver to fill with his 
or her own meaning. For example the word freedom can serve in both positive and negative 
form, and can depending of the context be attached multiple meanings. Discourse can also be 
comprised of different strands of other sub-discourses. For instance free market discourses 
consists of several other strands of discourse that has been incorporated into it. The use of this 
terminology in linguistic analysis in this thesis is applied in most detail to the speeches of 
President Obama, and not to the other textual data. This choice of methods is grounded in the 
assumption that the President´s speeches are very sophisticated products of language, where 
words, phrases and imagery is carefully chosen by professional speechwriters and tested on 
focus groups. For this reason, importance in analyzing linguistics at the sentence level can 
reveal more than more prosaic types of textual sources.  
 
 
2.3 Hegemonic Discourses and Economic Structures 
As this thesis will describe in chapter 3, different economic theories on state economic 
governance have been hegemonic at certain times in American history. These in turn have 
been shaped by discourses and created power discourses abut the function of the state in 
national economic governance. Chapter 3 is therefore a structural analysis on institutions that 
aims to augment the cultural analysis in the DA section. This chapter is straight historical 
narrative with the goal of outlining dialectical patterns between free market economics and 
                                                
40 M. Jørgensen & L.J. Phillips, Discourse analysis as theory and Method (London: SAGE, 2002), 69. 
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the state as a robust actor in the U.S economy. Thus the focus is on the two different groups – 
the free market advocates and the “Keynesian” welfare liberalist advocates – and their 
respective bids for the power to determine the function of the state in the economy. Of 
course, the political economy of the united state is a much more nuanced conversation than 
this, and dividing this section into two opposing views is an oversimplification. This is done 
for analytical clarity and the long time frame of this chapter needs an overall structure in 
order not to be too all encompassing. This dialectic between two ideas of the state serves as a 
meta-theory on the legitimacy of the state in the economy. Chapter 3 sets up the framework 
for a cultural analysis in chapter 5, which deals with MCE specifically, and helps to 
determine if we are in fact seeing a broadening of the political economic debate today.  
When we are doing structural analysis of institutions we can find help in Fairclough´s model 
for hegemonic discourses. Chapter 3 thus is structured around these stages:  
1. A crisis in the existing social order breaks down hegemony of a discourse, and opens up for 
different ideas and social groups to challenge the status quo.  
2. New discourses emerge who offer an explanation and a solution to the crisis, which constitute 
"imaginaries" for a new socio-economic order.  
3. Discourses compete for dominance. Potential for new discourses to supplant the hegemony of 
the old across social fields and scales.  
4. If a new discourse becomes hegemonic, it produces identity and behavioral change in 
institutions, which can shape the material world. 41 
Important to keep in mind is that hegemonic discourses have great capacity to adapt to 
changing circumstances, thus these transitions are usually slow. As John Kenneth Galbraith 
has stated: “ideas are inherently conservative. They “yield not to the attack of other ideas, but 
[…] to the massive onslaught of circumstances with which they cannot contend.”42 By 
occupying and developing a language around fluid signifiers, they are often able to hold 
together disparate or contradictory logics and values in order to stay relevant. By actively 
seeking out a vocabulary of fluid signifiers, hegemony is able to perform even though the 
circumstances have changed. As Laclau argues, the vocabulary of such discourses is “always 
going to be imprecise and fluctuating, not because of any cognitive failure, but because it tries 
                                                
41 Norman Fairclough, “Blair’s contribution to elaborating a new ‘doctrine of international community’” The Soft Power of War: Legitimacy 
and community in Iraq war discourses Edited by Lilie Chouliaraki [Journal of Language and Politics 4:1] (2005): 41–63. 
42 Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 17. 
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to operate performatively within a social reality which is, to a large extent, heterogeneous and 
fluctuating.”43  
As we will explore in chapter 3, the relationship between discourse and institutional 
change is not easily theorized, but certain social elements that determine discourse are re-
contextualized and filled with new meaning.  
The data from the White House is analyzed using the terminology developed by Laclau and 
Mouffe, drawing on the critical perspectives and stages of discourse hegemony from Fairclough´s 
CDA. Therefore this thesis is a multiperspectival approach to discourse analysis.  
 
As the purpose of this thesis is the demonstration that we are fist and foremost experiencing 
a shift in ideas, and then perhaps institutional developments (although the two are related), I place 
the realm of international power politics as largely residing outside the realm of ideas. Power 
politics, in my view, produces varying degrees of - or need for - discourse, but is only rarely 
shaped by discourse alone. In line with CDA, the acknowledgement of non-discursive elements is 
important in the international sphere. As Karl Rove allegedly said to President Bush the younger 
in 2004: “We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.”44 The sheer 
material resources that can potentially be mobilized for a particular cause can change discourse 
by overwhelming competing discourses. The advent of free market in the USA was not all about 
persuasion and the power of ideas: the suppressive force of the state and private actors was 
mobilized in an effort to crush the groups where alternative discourses circulated. Thus, I reserve 
power interests as to a large degree constant in terms of Realist logic, and thus these aspects of 
the theses are seen as in the non-discursive reality.  
 
For this reason I have chosen a relatively recent timeframe of starting with the 2014 
State of the Union Address, as this is speech is the first after significant economic recovery, 
and thus marks the beginning of the movement towards middle class economics. However the 
full thrust of this program is launched in the 2015 State of the Union Address, which marks 
the start of the explicit MCE the sum of which policies will be the President´s blueprint going 
forward.  
 
 
                                                
43 E. Laclau, On Populist Reason, (Verso, London, 2005), 189. 
44 Mark Danner, ”Words in a Time of War: On Rhetoric, Truth and Power,” in What Orwell Didn´t Know: Propaganda and the New Face of 
American Politics, ed. András Szántó, (Public Affairs 2007), 17. 
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2.4 – Data 
For the purpose of answering my research questions I am choosing to analyze key speeches 
made by President Barack Obama, as well as the economic reports on which these are based, 
plus other published material from the White House. The task is to search these data for 
discursive elements that is deployed by President Obama is championing these new policies, 
and secondly to put these elements in the wider context of international strategy. I have 
particularly been using the White House Web pages, which provide a very pedagogical and 
comprehensive presentation of the new economic plan. All the primary sources have been 
located online and are official from the U.S government. These include: 
• The “2014 State Of the Union Address” delivered by President Obama in the House of 
Representatives, U.S Capitol January 28 of 2014.45 
• The “2015 State Of the Union Address” delivered by President Obama in the House of 
Representatives, U.S Capitol January 20 of 2015.46   
 
As state of the Union Addresses, these speeches constitute the biggest outreach of the 
president in terms of audience. The address’ political significance is considerable and 
constitutes one of the most important yearly events of the Presidency. The Address is a 
mixture of a “summing up” of the year that has past, as well as outlining the President´s 
legislative agenda and the priorities ahead. Therefore it presents an opportunity to analyze 
both policy priorities and presentation in one speech. The limited time of the speech combined 
with the tradition of a weighted summation of Presidential priorities, means that what does get 
mentioned – and particularly what does not get mentioned – is of importance.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, the State of the Union Addresses, particularly the 2015 Address is 
devoted almost in its entirety to the Presidents MCE Plan. The 2015 Address by President 
Obama was broadcasted on 13 TV networks, reaching a TV audience of 31.7 million viewers, 
thus.47 On social media the speech was mentioned in 2.6 million tweets, reaching 9,7 million 
users. The Address is global in outreach, as these speeches are picked up by news agencies 
worldwide.  
                                                
45 A full transcript can be located at the White House Home Page: “Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address | January 20, 
2014”, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address Accessed September 01, 2015 
46 White House Home Page: “Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address | January 20, 2015”, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015 Accessed September 01, 2015 
47 “31.7 Million Viewers Tune in to watch Pres. Obama´s State of the Union Address” Nielsen Media 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2015/31-7-million-viewers-tune-in-to-watch-pres-obamas-state-of-the-union-adress.html 
Accessed August 31, 2015 
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Connected to the Addresses are the annual Economic Report of the President, (hereafter 
2014 or 2015 Report) which are prepared for the President by the Council of Economic 
Advisors (CEA) – an independent Agency under the Executive Branch. The economic plans 
that the President present to Congress are based on the CEA’s Report, and they constitute the 
fine blueprint for the President’s economic policy going forward. Therefore the reports of 
2014 and 2015 are given special attention, since they contain the details behind the Addresses:  
 
• 2014 and 2015 Economic Report of the President & The Annual Report of The Council of 
Economic Advisors. Presented to the President annually.48 49 
 
In regards to the FTAs, President Obama´s championing has been fervent, although the details 
have been opaque, to say the least. As details on the FTAs are restricted to a handful of people 
with privileged access, this thesis is unable to scrutinize this data. This serves as the foremost 
motivator for my critical interest, and thus I have consulted the best available secondary 
information on this aspect of the thesis. Even in the scholarly literature available, the 
treatment of these FTAs is frustratingly lacking in critical perspectives. I have thus focused on 
how the FTAs are communicated as part of a package of new economic policy initiatives by 
the President, while augmenting my understanding with various official sources. The below 
speech constitutes President Obama´s outspoken public defense of the FTAs. This speech is 
given to the Business Roundtable in Washington, which is a forum group for corporate 
interests: 
 
• “Remarks by the President at the Business Roundtable”, delivered by President Obama in 
Business Roundtable Headquarters, Washington D.C December 03, 2014 
The selected material is ample data to analyze the official narration of MCE. The contextual 
and theoretical material I shall be drawing from various articles, books and websites on the 
subject. My secondary sources thus includes:  
Key terminology, periodization and other theoretical insights on the international 
dimensions of laissez-faire and Bretton Woods will be drawn from Karl Polyani´s The Great 
Transformation (1944), who described the relationship between the market and the state as 
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inseparable, resulting in what he dubbed the “Market Society”.50 Building on this Polyani, 
John Gerard Ruggie´s article International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order (1982)51 provides the concept “embedded 
liberalism”, to describe the postwar compromise where Keynesianism became the global 
norm. The concept of hegemony will be drawn from the critical theories of Robert Cox (1987) 
Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History52 and the 
theories of Fairclough mentioned above. The concept of hegemony sees society as a struggle 
for power between actors both domestically and internationally. This struggle produces 
contest and antagonistic relations between actors with divergent goals, and tends to produce 
winners and losers. This is a central premise of the entire thesis, and power relations are 
central to the analysis of the texts. The international theoretical framework that underlies the 
foreign policy assumptions of this thesis is that of neo-realism. As such, this thesis assumes 
the backdrop of a regional contest for power between the blocks USA, China and the EU as a 
driver of international policy decisions.  
The concept of governmentality and the productive nature of power within a liberal 
regime are drawn from Michel Foucault´s essays on Biopolitics and other writings.53 A 
historical dialectical relationship between “ascetic” and “moral” discourses in capitalism, and 
other insights are from the book New Spirit of Capitalism (2007), which is also Boltanski and 
Chiapello´s term for parts of the return of free market fundamentalism as the economic ideal 
in 1980s.54  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
50 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2nd Edition, 2001). 
51 J. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. (International 
Organization, Volume 36, Issue 2, 1982) 
52 Maxime Quellet, ”Cybernetic Capitalism and the Information Society,” in Cultural Political Economy, ed. Jacqueline Best & Matthew 
Patterson, (Routledge, New York: NY, 2010), 184. 
53 Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au College de France, 1978-1979, (Paris: Seuill/Gallimard, 2004). 
54 Luc Boltanski & Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, (New York: Verso Books, 2007). 
24 
 
Chapter 3  
 
3.0 Institutional Dialectics of Market and State 
 
This chapter outlines the history of the political economy of laissez-faire in the United States, 
and the institutional consequences this has had in the U.S. The aim is to outline historically 
inspired by Fairclohug´s model in chapter 2 on how economic thinking and institutional 
change happen when an existing order is subject to crisis. Although the circumstances that 
bring about these shifts in economic thinking have varied substantially, we will not generalize 
here more then to remark as John Kenneth Galbraith: “Ideas come to be organized around 
what the community as a whole or particular audiences find acceptable.”55  
 
3.1 Laissez-faire  
Classic economic Liberalism´s intellectual roots run back to Adam Smith, Joseph Townsend, 
David Ricardo, and Thomas Malthus. Although diverse, these thinkers all attempted to 
theorize and systemize into a comprehensive framework the ideas of political liberalism of 
John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. The discourses of liberalism in this early period of 
American history became coached in a particular variant of classical liberalism where 
criticism of the power of monarchs, clergymen and aristocrats constituted an alternative to the 
feudal power structure, which was seen as illegitimate and incompatible with modernity. 
Liberalism in this sense is the idea that the reach and power of the government should be 
limited to allow personal freedom. Political liberalism is thus intrinsically connected to the 
freedom of the individual, and became a central theme in American political speech.  
A central safeguard of political liberalism was the right to private property. The 
universal application of property rights was seen as a guarantor against political abuse by the 
state, which should not grant special economic privileges for certain groups or classes in 
society. What the laissez-faire culture added as a central economic insight to political 
liberalism was the notion that individualism was not contrary to, but rather conducive to the 
broader public good.56 This insight is generally traced back to the writings of Adam Smith, 
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who fathered political economy as a field of inquiry. He held that individual pursuit of 
maximizing personal good, simultaneously and without knowing it, produces beneficial 
outcomes for the rest of society. Smith called this idea by a the metaphor “the invisible hand”: 
 
The rich […] divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to 
make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life which would have been made, had the earth been 
divided into equal proportions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, 
advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.57  
 
The ideas contained in classic economic liberalism of this early phase of political economy 
saw state intervention in the economy as associated with mercantilism or even worse, 
feudalism. The solution to safeguard individual liberty was conceived as creating a series of 
separations: The church from the state; the economy from the state; of moral and custom out 
of the family. A common contemporary reading of the invisible hand myth (which would 
become central to later free market fundamentalist interpretations), is the logic of libertarian 
individualism, where society is seen as constituted by and contingent on the pursuit of 
personal gain. Personal gain is inherently conducive to the “public” good, and state 
intervention in the market is invariably contrary to the public interest, later theorized as the 
“efficient market hypothesis”. The laissez-faire culture saw men in this market as atomized 
economic entities –a homo economicus – which pursued utility for itself and who in effect 
owed nothing to society.58 Although the laissez-faire culture touted the minimal involvement 
of the state in economic affairs the relationship between the state and the American citizens 
grew in the 1800s. The growing influence of the “Hamiltonian” system in America during 
industrialization furthered economic nationalism, protectionism and the expansion of 
economic regulation –all which ran counter to the ideals of laissez-faire. However, an 
argument for protecting the interests of capital, the discourses of laissez-faire commanded 
great political and cultural influence.  
With the advent of the industrial economy in the United States, other threats to 
individual freedom arose in the form of concentrated economic power in the hands of an 
economic elite. Here, the central disburses of laissez-faire that cherished individual freedom 
became vexed between concentrated political- and economic power, and opened up a central 
paradox that has been the focus of many critiques against free market fundamentalism. The 
critics of laissez-faire pointed out this inherent contradiction. Indeed, Alexis de Tocqueville 
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had issued a stern warning in his famous Democracy in America against the perversion of 
personal freedom doctrines turning into illiberal result: “If ever again permanent inequality of 
condition and aristocracy make their way into the world, it will have been by that door 
[manufacturing] that they entered.”59 However as developments of the “Gilded Age” 
progressed, the discourse of individual freedom and non-intervention by the state now 
ironically served as a justification for economic illiberalism.60  
Laissez-faire´s credence as an economic culture also had institutional advantages in the 
USA form the beginning of its foundation. Notwithstanding the Founding Fathers’ emphasis 
on egalitarianism and populism (anti elite), laissez-faire found good structural conditions in 
America from the opposite side of the egalitarian coin: the American skepticism to democratic 
politics – a skepticism that had since the inception of American political institutions been 
represented by the moneyed interests. This sentiment is perfectly expressed in the Federalist 
No.10 by John Madison, where he warned against democratic populist politics as a potential 
threat to America´s capital class. To guard against this “factionalism” in political institutions, 
property rights needed to be secure and put beyond the purview of the state, since the 
population was fallible and prone to serve special interest that could be contrary to capital 
investments. Thus, parts of the American political institutional structure are conducive to a 
weak and ineffectual state by design, which in a way created the laissez-faire state. Thus, if 
the state was to play a more active role in the economy, it would have to develop the mandate 
and wherewithal to do so, and this development would be slow in making.  
Later, John Maynard Keynes in an article titled The End of Laissez-Faire published in 
1926 saw this inherent elitism as the only this that supported the laissez-faire culture. He 
lamented: 
[…] individualism and laissez-faire could not, in spite of their deep roots in the political and moral philosophies 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, have secured their lasting hold over the conduct of public 
affairs, if it had not been for their conformity with the needs and wishes of the business world of the day. They 
gave full scope to our erstwhile heroes, the great business men [sic].61  
 
 In moral terms, laissez-faire, with its emphasis on libertarian individualism and the 
moral superiority of private initiatives gave credence to an economy where the strong were 
entitled to what they could take, and the weak had to be disciplined by the mechanismes of 
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the market. Laissez-faire could as such become fused with the ideas of social-Darwinist 
theories of Herbert Spencer in this “natural law” that touted the survival of the fittest in a 
market economy. The market in this meaning functioned as an adjunct of “nature”. Hence, the 
health of the economy depended on the non-intervention by politicians and others, lest it 
disturb the process of obtaining the natural order. Laissez-faire gave rise to an amoral Neo-
Darwinist discourse that served as its explanation and justification for social hardships. Far 
removed from the liberal roots of the left from which it sprang, economic liberalism now 
invoked to justify individual hardships as the price of doing business.62 The chase for ever-
greater efficiency intensified in the decades after the 1890 became an outright obsession, 
which fostered a business culture with contempt for the weak. The core idea of the market as 
provider of discipline, order and merit has formed a substantial part of the modern free market 
fundamentalism’s politically conservative discourses and account for much of its appeal with 
conservative voters. Although the compatibility of political conservatism and free market 
governance might not be readily apparent, the market as a provider of order and discipline in a 
society that is seen to be unruly and chaotic bridges this gap.63 As we will see later in the 
resurgence of free market thinking, the free market provides moral guiding and character 
when seen through the lens of political conservatism.  
For its critics, however, Laissez-faire´s lack of morals made it hard in their eyes to 
reconcile the tensions between the opportunities the model touted and the inequality and 
hardships that happened under its aegis. As the name implies (“hands off”), the freedoms it 
envisioned were mainly of a “negative” kind, and the institutions it shaped reflected this 
outlook. The laissez-faire culture attempted to universalize a particular sort of economic 
liberalism that author and critic Karl Polyani called “disembedded liberalism” which “lifted 
the economy out from its social underpinnings.”64 He saw the liberalism that was created as 
wholly separate from the social realm, which created an economy that sought to shape the 
social world, rather than reflect the social world. He rejected that the economy could be 
abstracted from social relations and put in charge of governing society without causing protest 
and reactionary politics. He saw Marxism and other anti-capitalist politics as evidence of this. 
Laissez-faire as a mode of economic governance made it possible to always claim one was 
acting in the public interest, and thus one needed no other justifications – the goal of 
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economic expedience sufficed.65 As political scientist John Gerard Ruggie has observed, an 
economic model gains much of its power from an “underlying social purpose”.66 Laissez-
faire, to its critics, had no legitimate social purpose, and this created various counteractions in 
the form of social unrest and protest. Although anchored in classic economic liberalism, 
laissez-faire was by its marginalized groups seen as the legitimization for a system of abuse. 
Arguably, the early free market cultures moral shortcomings inspired the next generation of 
economists and politicians to work on a macroeconomic theory economic theory that sought 
to minimize the social harm of unbridled markets. This would form the core agenda of the 
political economy of the political left in later developments. 
Around the turn of the twentieth century America, tensions stemming from political and 
economic inequality loomed ever larger in the American. Forming the backdrop behind these 
developments, laissez-faire acted as the economic imaginary shaped institutional development 
and economic discussion. In professional economic circles, laissez-faire was considered the 
professional consensus. Therefore various discussions on the betterment of society happened 
outside established economics, or at the fringes of economic or (“pseudo economic”) milieus.  
In the absence of democratic discussions on the purpose and morality of capitalism, a 
wellspring of alternative explanations for the workings of the economy emerged. Marxism 
arose as a fundamental critique of the capitalist system, which it saw as outrageously unjust 
and absurd. Socialists, Marxists and their affiliated groups touted their criticism against the 
economic conditions in America, which they saw as an instrument of class power. During the 
same period, muckrake journalism; activists and other pundits took advantage of the 
increasing circulation of printed media to routinely disclose abuses by American corporations. 
Authors like Mark Twain, Jack London, Upton Sinclair and others narrated passionately of 
the plight of the underprivileged classes to wide audiences.67 Developments after the turn of 
the nineteenth century saw a coalescing of these disparate groups into the broader movement 
that has been called the “Progressives”. The Progressives would herald a new and more active 
approach to institution building by the government. The progressives embarked on a moral 
crusade to better American society as they saw it, and to achieve their goals they called upon 
they saw the need to use the state in ways that went against the laissez-faire state, where 
minimal state presence in economy matters was the norm. Out of the Progressive “era” lasting 
up until the New Deal, three landmark legislations were pushed by the progressive agenda 
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that saw an increase in the state´s mandate in the economy. First was the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (1887) that was aimed at regulating corruption in the railroad sector by placing it 
under federal instead of state rule. Second, the Federal Trade Commission (1914) that set up 
tribunals for cracking down on the consolidation of business monopolies. Third, the Federal 
Reserve System (1913) that was aimed at coordinating and regulating the banking practices at 
a federal level. In addition to the introduction of federal income tax in 1913, this expanded the 
role of the federal government in the economy, and thus chipped away at the edifice of the 
laissez-faire state.68 
 The most prominent representative of the progressive movement was Republican 
President Theodore Roosevelt. Although at heart more pragmatic than moralistic, he adopted 
a sharp moral rhetoric against the powerful business interests: "I regard this contest as one to 
determine who shall rule this free country—the people through their governmental agents, or 
a few ruthless and domineering men whose wealth makes them peculiarly formidable because 
they hide behind the breastworks of corporate organization.”69 In terms of institution building, 
the progressives had little faith in constitutional formalism as in itself conducive to a good 
society. Progressivism was influenced by Hegelian “end state” teleological arguments, 
holding that man was very much improvable. This improvement could be directed from the 
state, thus the rationale for a more social-scientific state arose under the progressive banner.  
Decidedly ambitious, the Progressives believed in the active role of the state in constructing a 
moral society, thus, they were fundamentally at odds with the culture of laissez-faire.  
Although never a single unified movement, the progressives successfully brought a 
moral “anti-oligarchy” discourse into the political mainstream. By focusing on social aspects 
of the economy, the progressives perceived the threat of concentrated power also coming 
from the concentration of economic power, and not just through political privilege, and thus 
recognized one of laissez-faire´s market fundamentalist blind spots. This proved to be the key 
to overcome the problem of political factionalism. The progressives were able to join ranks on 
both sides of the political aisle between the egalitarian Left and the individualist Right by 
appealing to deep-seated American suspicions of centralized power in all forms. These efforts 
came into fruition with the presidencies of Roosevelt and Taft, who started the institutional 
transformation away from the laissez-faire state.70 Three consecutive reformist presidents: 
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Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson enacted “trust-busting”71 
legislation and gave Progressive concessions that curbed the powers of the masters of the 
Gilded Age.72 This was the beginning of the modern American state. To be able to assume an 
expanded role in the economy the state needed the money to implement policy (taxes); the 
knowhow of how to improve the citizenry (professionalization of bureaucracy); and the 
legitimacy to act (moral discourses).73 
The Progressive movement represented the first in a series of three hard blows to 
laissez-faire that eventually eroded its sources of support. The second was the expansion of 
the role of government demanded by preparation to enter World War I. The second, and final 
straw was the Great Depression, which exploded the legitimacy of laissez-faire and 
subsequently relegated the free market discourses of laissez-faire in all but infamy for a 
generation.  
 
3.2 Welfare Liberalism and the New Deal.  
The Great Depression and the material destruction it wrought vanquished almost overnight 
the entire culture of laissez-faire. The American public in this period witnessed euphoric and 
rapacious financial activities that the unbridled market had caused. The sheer material 
destruction and the moral hazard that had preceded the Depression became evidence of all 
that was wrong with the free market. The Depression and the subsequent inadequate response 
by the Hoover administration created a demand for new and better ideas to enter into political 
economy. This period drew on the lessons of the progressives, and witnessed the creation of 
the welfare state brought into being by the Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his Administration.  
The advent of welfare liberalism as a mode of state governance transformed the institutional 
landscape of American politics. The free market governance mentality and the minimal state 
was replaced by “Keynsianism” and the “hands-on” rather than the “hands off” state of 
laissez-faire. As all the underpinnings of the free market economic system gave way, the 
Roosevelt Administration implemented the economic institutions of welfare liberalism with a 
broad range of public agencies which carried out politically defined social policies. A new 
generation of economists and politicians found themselves in demand. Those that viewed 
laissez-faire as immoral or unnatural, but had stood on the sidelines as laissez-faire had been 
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hegemonic in economic circles, now assumed the reins of the American economy. The result 
was an entirely new model of political economy. Anti-capitalist discourses were dominant 
among the public, which meant that the political leeway to build political institutions against 
these interests was considerable.74 
However, Roosevelt did not cater to the radical interests of American politics. For 
Marxists in particular, the recent developments leading up to the Great Depression appeared 
to be vindications of Marx’ predictions: World War I caused by war mongering elites; the 
collapse of international Gold Standard; The Russian Revolution overthrowing the Romanov 
dynasty in Russia; and now the apparent collapse of capitalism itself – it seemed like all 
Marxist prophesies were coming true in quick succession.75 But Roosevelt wanted to save 
American capitalism, not overturn it. To achieve this he would have to make a case for a 
moral “re-appraisal of values” that acknowledged the public rage against Wall Street bankers 
by empowering the American blue-collar worker, but simultaneously avoids conceding to 
radical elements in American society. FDR first wanted to restore confidence in the American 
economy, and then set it on a more just course: He sought to, as he said: “assist the 
development of an economic declaration of rights, an economic constitutional order.”76 In 
short: He wanted to democratize the American economy.  
In his widely circulated speeches, Roosevelt framed the Depression as a crisis of 
morals. He viciously attacked the principles of laissez-faire as a defunct system of ideas that 
had corrupted American business culture and the nation´s protestant work ethic with it. His 
economic programs were articulated as serving social justice, and the application of moral 
discourses that criticized “greed” and “corruption” became central in welfare liberalism 
throughout the Roosevelt years.77 The “greed” discourse mirrored public frustrations, and was 
also characteristic of the professional attitudes of many contemporary economists that 
emerged as influential in this period. After the stock market crash, the public esteem of the 
economics profession fell in disrepute as much of the public associated economists with the 
abject conditions now experienced in America. Economists or politicians that advocated for 
free market solutions and the primacy of corporations found themselves isolated.78 Roosevelt 
made sure people could look to the government to fix the economy, and scholars or 
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businessmen that argued otherwise lost their audience. This was a peculiar situation, since the 
America had long been a nation that prided itself in pro-market and pro-business politics.  
In this context of new economic ideas, one particular economists’ star was on the rise.  
John Maynard Keynes, a British economist who had foreseen and publicly warned about the 
Great Depression became a chief architect of the new state model of welfare economics. His 
ideas were embraced by the Roosevelt administration, as it offered solutions to the crisis. 
With his ideas, Keynes offered crisis ridden governments a way out of crisis without going 
against public opinion. Very much a supporter of economic countercyclical stimulus by the 
state, Keynes supported public works programs. The central idea in Keynes’ models was that 
the state should engage in deficit spending to kick-start the economy. Traditions economists 
believed that the spending of the government would create burdensome debts for the state and 
would increase inflation – fears that are still prevalent among free market advocates today.79 
Contrasted with the bleak assessments of free market economists of the time like Joseph 
Schumpeter and Friedrich Hayek, Keynes' message was decidedly upbeat.80 
Directly attacking laissez-faire, Keynes explicitly objected greed as the sole incentive 
for human action, saying as early as 1926: “The moral Problem of our age is the love of 
money.”81 For Keynes this utilitarianism was not only theoretical folly, but conducive to a 
human culture that fostered and indeed needed the hardship of some, in order to advance the 
successful, and as such, responsible for “moral decay of civilization”. The economic way to 
achieve a “moral economy” became for Keynes and his followers an economy in which there 
was full employment. Employment was by Keynes, as many others seen as a key to political 
stability and a way to relieve personal suffering.82 Economic libertarianism as expressed in 
free market ideals were absent any positive social goal, and thus to Keynes, were simply a 
means to achieve something else, not a valid end in itself. Keynes was not by intention 
committed to the cause of one particular class, but rather he entertained a set of ideas about 
enlightened political rule of the economy. This meant that politicians should possess the tools 
to check human impulses of self-aggrandizement, through a regime that “deliberately aims at 
controlling and directing economic forces in the interests of social justice and social stability”, 
Keynes stated. Thus a professionalization of economics where science replaced dogma ought 
to characterize the new generation of economists.  
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As the New Deal brought Americans social security and economic regulations that 
sought to protect workers against corporate abuse and arbitrary fluctuations of the business 
cycle, the American economy in the process became as a social construction. A “good” 
economy was constitutive of a good moral society. Roosevelt rejected the “free market 
society” as the sole organizing principle of social life. Both he and Keynes saw the highly 
normative aspects of laissez-faire, and argued there was nothing “natural” about the free 
market. It had been created by the state, and hence the state, given a positive mandate, could 
be the guardian of a new socioeconomic model. This self-reflexivity of social goals both on 
the part of the economy (full employment) and politics (welfare) created a more discursive 
politics that at created democratic responsibility for economic policy.83  
The postwar shift was also that of economic culture and the way the economic 
hegemonic discourses identified the public. Beginning in the intrabellum period, the advent of 
mass communication, advertising, and “public relations” combined with the establishment of 
new public and national media institutions could reach the American population in ways that 
could not be done earlier. The Roosevelt Administration capitalized on these developments to 
identify an American public vis-à-vis the state. The conscious efforts by public and private 
entities to establish a consumer culture replaced the “homo economicus” of laissez-faire with 
a more national, political citizen. Thus this era has been identified with the creation of a new 
public, which Jaqueline Best and others have called the “citizen-consumer”. 84 Thus, with a 
new macroeconomic theory and new technologies – in essence a new model of capitalism - a 
“new” public was defined in the process.  
 
Keynes held that one of the reasons for the longevity of laissez-faire was the lack of 
convincing alternative political-economic frameworks. Marxism, socialism and mercantilism 
were the other ideas around at the time, and each of these could be quickly dismissed as 
“radical” or “utopian”. Consequently, counterarguments to laissez-faire were either too 
complex or too facile. Keynes believed that in the American context, the force of laissez-faire 
could partly be in explained by its simplicity. Its relationship with classic liberal ideals on 
individualism and the support from myths on the freedom of the individual and the success of 
the self-made man made its discourses powerful and hard to argue against. Keynes grappled 
with the question of “individual liberty”, as it was lacking any higher principle since 
“socialism and laissez-faire all laid their stress on freedom, the one negatively to avoid 
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limitations on existing freedom, the other positively to destroy natural or acquired 
monopolies”.8586 Freedom was a concept unfit in modern economics because the liberalism of 
Locke, Rousseau and Hume, which it was based on, could not be continuously reconciled 
with the changing nature of society. Therefore it had become a divided doctrine between 
social and individual utilitarianism. Before the Great Depression, popular assumptions on 
laissez-faire thought it were the shared professional consensus among economists making the 
job for arguing against this seem like those that were critical to laissez-faire were “out of 
tune” with the times. Also, as mentioned earlier, the principles benefited the established order 
in America, whose wealthy supporters could ensure that the idea was given pride of place in 
the corridors of political power. Nevertheless, Keynes believed that the sustained critique 
from him and an ever more vocal group economists would manage to influence public 
debates. Keynes´ ideas were not accepted until the Great Depression had made these ideas in 
demand.  
However, Keynesianism was not a complete reversal of the negative state, and the 
introduction of a state directed economy, but merely sought to have the economy “embedded” 
in social relations. Keynes thus advocated a third way between Marxism and laissez-faire. He 
believed that the economy was not a system perfectly devised, nor was it destined to 
destruction as Marxist teleology grimly prophesized. The economy was merely an extension 
of human life, - a social function - and as such prone to both folly and intelligence. In line 
with progressive principles at the time, the economy was like the humans themselves, fallible, 
but very much improvable by reason.87 Keynes opposed both laissez-faire and socialism 
because they were both exclusively materialist. They were both “unscientific”, individualistic 
and both were “different reactions to the same intellectual atmosphere”.88 They took a 
simplified form of liberty for granted, as people were not simply motivated by material 
reality, but prone to “animal spirits”. These “animal spirits” meant that theoretical models 
were only of limited utility, as the practical world is full of irregularity that will thwart efforts 
to confine to any economic model or dogma.89 To ensure stability in the economic system 
there had to be state oversight over certain areas, a key point in later discourses critical of the 
free market. Entirely new institutions had to be created to perform these functions.  
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The economics of Keynes were political in both intention and nature. Since Keynes’ 
theories implied that the state should play a large role in regulating economic life, the political 
left quickly embraced him, and embraces his ideas still. Conversely, his theories were seen as 
a threat to the parts of the political right that had prospered under laissez-faire. Keynes’ ideas 
on political economics were ultimately contained in his magnum opus The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money (1936), became the touchstone work for a generation of 
economists, and gave name to this whole new way of thinking about the role of 
macroeconomics, “Keynesianism”.   
The Keynesian revolution was certainly politically expedient for the left in the U.S, 
whose frustrations over the inadequate role of government in the economy were as old as the 
industrial age. The freedom of the economy was compromised was justified in order to meet 
defined social goals. These social goals took form in discourse at the national level, which 
largely “internalized” class relations. Through working-class institutions and labor unions the 
political center of gravity was very much to the left in these years.90 But also a qualitative 
shift in the kinds of ideas that were put forth changed. America could not return to a system of 
“voluntarism” in economic governance, where private actors cooperated with the state at their 
own convenience. The forging of a positive program to rebuild the American economy was 
needed. The politics of the FDR Administration created institutions out of this intellectual 
atmosphere.  
 
3.3 Keynesianism Goes International 
Keynesianism as a model of economic governance, achieved international outreach after 
World War II. The collapse of the global financial system in the wake of the Great Depression 
was seen as a leading cause of the rise of extremism in Europe, and this shaped the debate 
about the post war international order. One U.S delegate at the Bretton Woods conference 
soberly reflected on the alternative to a new financial order as “the spread of depression form 
country to country” and the return of the “twin evils of international economic aggression and 
monetary disorder.”91 To facilitate social stability and economic growth in Europe after the 
war, Keynesian economic principles were institutionalized into the international financial 
architecture in the Bretton Woods regime. Replacing laissez-faire globalization, Bretton 
Woods brought into the international system its self-reflexive social aim of full employment 
and welfare liberalism. In this regime, states were recognized as the chief actors and 
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considerable economic powers were afforded international diplomacy and national 
policymakers. Two new supranational bodies were created to facilitate this: The IMF and the 
World Bank. The Bretton Woods regime cushioned sovereign states against the economic 
pressures by regulating international capital flows and fixing exchange rates to the dollar. For 
the first time in economic history, transnational financial flows were thoroughly regulated by 
political diplomacy. This allowed states to strike a balance between “universal” demands of 
international capital, and particular domestic political objectives – allowing states to pursue a 
wide range of responses to international capitalism.92 
As a financial regime, the Bretton Woods system made room for national political 
decisions within the system and restrained the economic power of the USA. The defining 
feature of this economic order was stability. This stability was imagined in social terms first, 
and then put into practice in the economy.93 Indeed, the system was underwritten by the 
hegemony of the USA as the postwar world’s only creditor nation. Also the attractiveness of 
American culture played a big part in advancing the American economic model as an object 
of emulation by other states. American life was by many Europeans seen as culturally 
attractive and often superior to the traditionalism of European society.94 An attractive postwar 
vision was created by the American “citizen-consumer” that enjoyed material wealth and 
social harmony.95 The American political right in this period largely accepted the state as the 
foremost agent in the economy, and a bipartisan consensus of the active state and the active 
citizen became focused around the Keynesian framework. The enactment of welfare reforms, 
government entitlement programs and Keynesian fiscal policy all demanded a government 
that intervened in the economy, and all required bipartisanship to be able to pass through 
Congress. 
In the book The Great Transformation (1944), political economist Karl Polyani held 
that no society prior to the age of laissez-faire had cultivated a form of market exchange that 
was not somehow grounded in, or responsible for, the social relations it sprang from. Laissez-
faire´s ideal of the self-regulating was a utopian project that sought to govern society 
according to economic logic alone. This economic logic sought to commodify “land, labor 
and money” in ways that pretended these were not the function of social life, and this had 
resulted in massive social and spatial dislocation. 96 As scholar John Gerard Ruggie has 
                                                
92 Eisner, The American Political Economy, 89 
93 Georg Kell & John Gerard Ruggie, “Global markets and social legitimacy: the case for the ‘Global Compact’.” 
94 Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order”, 382 
95 Best, “From the Top-Down”, 365. 
96 Polanyi, The Great Transformation,104 
37 
 
subsequently added to Polyani’s insights, the New Deal and the post-war arrangements at 
Bretton Woods which developed therefrom, functioned to “re-embed” economic relations 
back in social relations – a term which Ruggie called “embedded liberalism”.97 By defining 
domestic economic stability as a normative goal and allowing for continuous negotiations 
between states, the architects of this new order, Keynes and his American colleague Harry 
Dexter White had in fact created such an “embedded” order after the war. This new 
international regime was not just a set of technical negotiations, but had also articulated a 
distinct normative social purpose of compromise and restraint that moved beyond the mere 
task of ensuring economic stability. They had created a self-reflexive purpose in the global 
economy – a form of narrative the advocates of the self-regulated markets had not attempted 
to construct for laissez-faire.98 
At the center of these developments was Keynes, who provided the language and 
economic models of this new liberal order. Keynes had been convinced of the shortcomings 
of laissez-faire since he had attended the peace conferences at Versailles after World War I. 
His objective was the formulation of a “middle way”, and as such he shared Polyani´s theory 
of laissez-faire´s tendency to cause social instability and protest. Through Keynes and his 
influence, the way in which the “economy” was viewed changed dramatically after World 
War II. The idea of a national macro economy, and that it could be managed to produce 
specific social outcomes had been one of the fundamental lessons after two wars the 
Depression. The post war order would thus be centered on the national economies.99 
 
Besides these cultural and structural arguments, many economic historians have pointed 
to more pragmatic reasons for the rise of the state in the economy. As the political and 
economic foundations for the global economy had been shattered by two world wars, various 
forms of human association that had been transnational were reduced to the national scale. 
Most major corporations became national in scope. The sheer destruction and breakdown own 
the international order made the state the “default” level of social, political and economic 
organization. 100 In the U.S and elsewhere, as a product of the crises of the period the 
prevailing form of nationality became more civic in nature, and not ethnical. The Second 
World War had necessitated a bureaucratic and directed economy and a vast expansion of the 
state apparatus. These circumstances meant that the national state – by necessity – had to be 
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the effective actor in the economy. This created a notion of accountability for a set of shared 
values represented in the national discourse that would later be severely challenged 
disappeared under globalization´s separation of production and finance and these political 
institutions.  
 
3.4 Free Market Ideas in the Age of Keynesianism 
In all political stripes, the political and social upheaval of world wars and depression invited 
new and big thinking in how to organize society. In this social and economic climate it had 
been grasped by both the political Right and Left that the economy was intricately a part of 
society, and was thus the concern of the intellectual sphere. Dictatorships and revolutions had 
sprung from economic mismanagement, proving that economic life was intrinsically 
connected to social life. Any new grand economic model had to conceptualize a moral 
framework to support it. Ideas on the free market and libertarian individualism went into a 
period on inward-looking deliberation. The free market advocates, now largely retreated from 
the corridors of public policy-making to a few isolated pockets around the world, found a 
beacon of hope in the book The Good Society (1937) by Walter Lippman.  
Intended as a protest against the Keynesian movement, this book was kindled the flame 
of free market thinkers, and represented the start of a new effort to reframe free markets as 
conducive to a moral society.101 Lippman, a very influential thinker in his time, presented in 
his Good Society a very bifurcated view of the world as a choice between laissez-faire on the 
one side and “authoritarian collectivism” on the other – both of which were not “free” 
societies. Intending to redeem the reputation of the free market the he argued that laissez-faire 
was a system of “non-regulatrion” which was “quite literally, a complete impossibility” and 
that state planning was doomed to failure because it led to the “coercive direction by 
government of the life and labor of the people.” The solution for Lippman was a system of 
governance at-a-distance by carefully designed laws that would ensure the maximum level of 
individual freedom, but at the same “minimize monopolies and collectivisms of all kinds.”102 
Such a system could be found by returning to the economic principles of Adam Smith, which 
he felt had been betrayed by the laissez-faire culture. In the Good Society Lippman discussed 
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this early conception of political liberalism at length. However, Lippman struggled to 
establish a positive set of policies in his book that were not inconsistent with the policies it 
denunciated.103 
 Influenced by Lippman another notable intellectual who seized the zeitgeist of the 
times was Austrian-born economist Friedrich Hayek. Aiming to shape the postwar debate on 
the future economic order, Hayek published in 1944 The Road to Serfdom, in which warned 
of the “tyranny that inevitably led from government control of economic decision-making.”104 
Widely read by free market advocates, the Road to Serfdom made Hayek the focus of 
attention of the scattered group of intellectuals that had been marginalized by the Keynesian 
revolution. In 1947 this transatlantic clique of free market advocates founded the Mount 
Pelerin Society – a think tank for economic libertarianism led by Hayek. The group comprised 
of economists, philosophers, historians, intellectuals, business leaders that were loosely 
committed to free markets as a means of achieving individual freedom. The group included 
figures like Ludwig von Mises, Karl Popper and Milton Friedman.105 Although there was 
internal disputes on the extent to which the market could be allowed free reign of the 
economy, the group was united in their quest for what they saw was a moral economy, absent 
state management. Their founding statement expresses their moral and social purpose:  
 
The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the earth’s surface the essential 
conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared. In others they are under constant menace 
from the development of current tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the voluntary group are 
progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power. Even that most precious possession of Western Man, 
freedom of thought and expression, is threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege of 
tolerance when in the position of a minority, seek only to establish a position of power in which they can 
suppress and obliterate all views but their own. The group holds that these developments have been fostered by 
the growth of a view of history which denies all absolute moral standards and by the growth of theories which 
question the desirability of the rule of law. It holds further that they have been fostered by a decline of belief in 
private property and the competitive market; for without the diffused power and initiative associated with these 
institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may be effectively preserved.106 
 
The Mount Pelerin Society thus emerged in the postwar years as a purposive community 
which project was to save liberty by creating a “new economic liberalism”. The function of 
the Mount Pelerin Society conference was to discuss the version of liberalism that The Good 
Society and the Road To Serfdom had outlined but not positively formulated. Hayek had 
understood that their political philosophy would never get off the ground if it only were 
articulated in material and reactive terms. The “new economic liberalism” would have to be 
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morally as well as spiritually attractive - a point that Milton Friedman (an unknown quantity 
then, but whose influence would later be considerable), would redress. Through discussions at 
the summit, the Society was going to address the lack of articulated social vision their ideas 
gestured towards. The founders of the Mount Pelerin Society were intensely concerned with 
moral aspects of capitalism, but differed in their emphasis on what parts of the economy that 
could be revised and which ones to keep. However, many attendants did not share the 
sanguine faith that Hayek had in the social virtues of the market. Thus, normative 
assumptions on human nature were at the heart of the debate, as they had been since the 
writings of Adam Smith. The Society was, however, united in their view that the individual 
libertarianism that had been fostered in the laissez-faire culture was devoid of positive content 
and needed revision.107  
As the Mount Pelegrin Society matured into the 1950s, they found their policies 
increasingly unwanted in America. The sense of urgency and possibility that had shaped the 
movement in the formation during the war had now given way to a period marked by 
economic growth, international stability and a general sense of moderation of government 
policy, exemplified by the calmness of the Eisenhower Administration. Developments in 
Europe had not come to fruition that way Hayek had hoped, as many states pursued with a 
moderation of policies were mixed economies between public planning and market 
mechanisms was the norm. Increasingly, Hayek felt like the window of opportunity had 
closed on the movement – especially in the U.S where he had relocated to teach at the 
Chicago School of Economics. Hayek moved to Germany in 1962 and receded from active 
leadership of the Society. His vision of building a transatlantic movement for the resurrection 
of free markets felt increasingly a pipe dream. He conceded: “I shall probably rapidly loose 
interest in the proceedings and get tired of the thing.”108  
Hayek´s endorsement of free markets and aloof governments were attractive as they 
resonated with American individualism, now re-contextualized as “free enterprise” and “self-
sufficiency”.109 The Road to Serfdom was distributed to all General Motors employees, and a 
condensed version published in Reader´s Digest in 1945, reaching an audience of 8,750,000 
subscribers.110 Not yet mainstream, free market ideology was now increasingly circulating in 
the public sphere.  
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While The Road to Serfdom was a public success, it also revealed shortcomings in the 
free-market camp. The group’s reluctance to connect their ideas to a broader worldview had 
relegated them to an ivory tower, resolving internal disputes instead of convincing others to 
join their ranks. The Road to Serfdom proved to Hayek and his followers that the failures of 
the free market ideology after the Great Depression had been that of rhetoric, not economic 
theory. Free market libertarian advocates had spent their passion attacking and debating the 
theoretical economics of Keynes, rather than championing for a new alternative. They 
increasingly concluded that they would have to abandon their technocratic formalism and turn 
to a more “people-friendly” brand of economics if they were going to be able to see their 
philosophy translated into action. This development from fragmentation to unity would turn a 
corner for the reinvention of economic liberalism in the postwar years. Slowly, emerging from 
isolation, they began to see themselves as public intellectual figures, fighting against the 
influence of the Keynesian mindset and laissez-faire as well. “Collectivism”, in all its 
perceived forms, became the main target. Increasingly, the group came to terms with the 
herculean task they had ahead of them, and settled in for the long haul of building a coalition. 
The postwar years would see this scattered group of like-minded idealists turn into a 
community that increasingly thought and acted in concert. The social vision stated in The 
Good Society was adopted as the groundwork for a new and broader approach to free market 
economics in the following years as a social philosophy, not a theory of economics. The 
Society shifted from a broad transatlantic coalition to a narrower focused group led by the 
Anglo-American factions, led from the University of Chicago. But, in the Chicago School 
Milton Friedman´s star was rising and he would be the prime mover in the decade to come.  
Although the “new liberal” ideas had little impact on public policy, these ideas were 
afloat in conservative segments of the public sphere. William F. Buckley´s conservative 
magazine National Review had become increasingly popular. By the start of the 1960s the 
magazine had 100.000 subscribers and was increasingly influential in the conservative 
political scene. The magazine combined a “traditional” and conservative view on American 
social life with libertarian ideals of free markets and libertarian individualism, and had 
become an outlet for the ideas of the Mount Pelerin Society.111 What had started in the 
reclusive world of withdrawn intellectuals now had a growing audience in the popular sphere. 
The building of new economic liberalism had been a long and arduous process for Hayek and 
his associates. Their limited breakthroughs aside, the question still remained for market 
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advocates how to make their ideas attractive to the public. By in the early 1960s the 
heterogeneous group of scholars and intellectuals associated with the Chicago School had 
centered on Milton Friedman. Friedman had many qualities that the movement lacked; He 
was charismatic, bold, confident and a great communicator. His ability to reduce technical 
and moral complexities into plausible and agreeable solutions – all by the virtues of the 
unbridled market – made him friendly to public audiences. Rhetorically, he transcended the 
uncertainties of his colleagues and in doing so he emboldened them and others to advocate for 
the merit of the free market. Friedman’s case for the inherent morality of market mechanisms 
signaled an end to concerns of the free markets social consequences that his colleagues had 
debated for decades. Through Friedman, the Mount Pelerin Society and the Chicago School 
would experience the rarest of things for political thinkers; they would see their ideas shape 
the politics of their time.112 
 
At the same time, ominous signs were looming in the horizon for the Keynesian welfare 
state. The Kennedy-Johnson era of expansive welfare over the fiscal budget seemed initially 
to work as unemployment dropped and GDP grew. Keynesianism was the tool for these 
administrations’ efforts to combat poverty and reduce unemployment. As the Johnson 
Presidency with its massive federal spending managed to keep unemployment below the 
target of 4%, Keynesian techniques had worked, but inflation was creeping upwards, aided by 
massive federal spending on the Vietnam War. By the Time Richard Nixon assumed office in 
1969, the inflation rate was over 5% annually, and there was little chance that Vietnam War 
spending would drop in the foreseeable future. By 1971 unemployment had mounted to 7.1% 
and American businesses and consumers were feeling the effects of what would be labelled 
“stagflation” – a condition which the Keynesian approach had no remedies for. Further 
burdening the American economy, Nixon pursued very ambitious environmental protection 
legislation that, although well-intended, further burdened American businesses and increased 
state bureaucracy thus adding to the economic frustrations.113  
The international side of America’s obligations as the sponsor of the “embedded 
liberal” regime was cracking too. The Bretton Woods mechanisms were undermined by 
several developments seemingly beyond its control. Towards the end of the 1960s, the 
international system of diplomatically managed capital flows was under severe pressure from 
cash flows that bypassed the system via an independent market called the “Eurodollar” market 
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based in the financial district, the City of London. The system of fixed exchange rates was 
unable to cope with the increasing volume of capital that flowed between international 
borders. These new volumes of money were coming from coming from two main sources:  
The national surplus of oil producing states in the Middle East and the expansive fiscal 
stimulus in the USA from the Johnson Administration’s “Great Society” spending and the 
Vietnam War. Thus, two central pillars of the Bretton Woods system were eroding. The 
system of convertibility of dollars into gold was abandoned in 1971. Exchange rates were 
soon allowed to float freely. One of the anchors that restrained the global economy was now 
severed.  
Domestically, the U.S presided over rising inflation and unemployment. As stagflation 
spread across much of the western economies, observers concluded Keynesian policies were 
no longer working. Nixon made a futile attempt to control inflation by enacting price controls, 
but was unable to curb inflation, and inflation remained high throughout the decade, reaching 
a peak at 12%.114 The goal of full employment proved impossible to achieve, as several 
administrations during the entire decade grappled with stagflation. The moral and intellectual 
purchase Keynesian policies had enjoyed was disappearing, and by the time Ronald Reagan 
was campaigning the political atmosphere was ripe for alternative ideas.  
Attempts to save the Keynesian welfare state were largely unsuccessful. Rather than 
abandoning state control over the economy at the first signs of trouble, the U.S’ Democrat-
controlled Congress, with a Republican President Richard Nixon, rolled out a series of sundry 
regulations and directives to combat the ills of the economy. Nixon, for the time still believing 
the Keynesian framework could save the day, stated “we are all Keynesians now.”115 But 
support for the left´s economic program was dwindling. Unemployment had weakened the 
power of unions. 
 Internationally, the Bretton Woods institutions were increasingly irrelevant. Practically 
and intellectually Keynesianism was in disarray. In this period, the political Left in the U.S 
were becoming increasingly out of touch with reality, as they failed to grasp the global nature 
of the dynamics of capital accumulation, and the pressures this was putting the national 
economy under. Traditional national social democratic solutions were insufficient to restore 
growth and end inflation. Alarmed by the prospects of even deeper government control in the 
economy by the political left, the business community was jolted into action.116 Against this 
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backdrop, the upper class in America acted increasingly in concert, concerned that they could 
be virtually extinct as a class. These fears were not totally unfounded, though, as social 
movements, unions and left leaning politician’s wielded considerable political influence, and 
a general decreasing of political significance in the upper classes, as top-earners saw profits 
fall year after year.  
During the seventies, a considerable effort on the part of the Right served to bring their 
interests to the forefront of the political agenda. The great strides that had been made by the 
Chicago School/Mount Pelerin Society to form a moral rationale for free markets, was 
strategically adopted by much of the business elite. They realized that if they were to succeed 
in implementing a new economic philosophy they needed to approach it in a way that could 
be translated into a moral political philosophy. Mere advocacy of free markets would almost 
certainly be seen as a revival of laissez-faire, and as such, not legitimate. They needed an 
attractive message that could be the intellectually and morally supported by Americans in 
order to shift the thinking of Americans of what the role of the state, and even the individual 
should be. Friedman and his associates had been perfecting just such a message. But how free 
market fundamentalism became the answer to these problems was not certain at the time. 
Indeed, at the time, free market fundamentalism, as we know it today was far from a unified 
political ideology. This defies the belief many critics have that free market fundamentalism 
was strategic in its intentions in this period.117 Their resurgence to politics was far more 
characterized by discord and ambiguity than that.  
Towards the end of the 1970s, another source of pressure was laid on the postwar social 
democratic model from increased competition for the U.S economy from overseas. U.S 
magazine covers featured critical articles on the decline of America, as it had fallen behind 
the more successful and industrious competitors like Japan and Germany. In very much a 
similar vein to today´s “decline” discourse, the sense of decline eroded the legitimacy of the 
economic thinking of the day, and this helped alternative economic thinking gain foothold. 
Defenders of the more social democratic brand of economics also became defenders of the 
status quo, which saw massive unemployment and rising prices in the U.S while new players 
in the global economy were seemingly outcompeting American workers.118 What was in the 
Eisenhower-Kennedy years as a belief in the state could solve complex social problems by 
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pulling the Keynesian leavers gave way to a renewed belief in unbridled markets and growing 
vexations about the role of the state as a solution to these problems.119 
 
3.5 The Return of Laissez-faire.  
The Pelerin Society’s shift from of economic theory to political philosophy under the 
leadership of Friedman and his colleagues at the Chicago School of Economics, started to 
bring the movement into mainstream politics. The new economic liberals meticulously crafted 
their rhetoric over classical American concepts like individualism, populism, anti-government 
and empty signifiers like “opportunity”, “freedom”.120 This message catered to many 
disaffected the conservative backlash that was building in America in the 1970s. Weary of 
social unrest, stagflation, crises and violent protest, many Americans wanted a return to 
normal conditions. Many gravitated towards the political right, as Reagan presented a path 
towards order, prosperity and a return to classical American values. With the political left 
increasingly associated with various forms of social activism, the “New Left” became a 
fractured group that lost their grip on the mainstream voters. With the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods regime, and the political left split into factions around “issues”, the economic 
paradigm of the left was now sufficiently weakened as to be challenged head on.  
Friedman opened up a new chapter when he assumed leadership of the Society in the 
mid 1960s. From grappling with the dynamics of state intervention versus free markets in a 
context of combating the effects of the Great Depression and the subsequent crises, their new 
approach was a political economic framework that addressed the social and political currents 
of the time: The Cold War. Freidman tended to see the world in terms of a Cold War dualism, 
where “collectivism” was represented by the Soviet Union, and the U.S was its moral 
opposite. His bifurcated rhetoric resonated well with audiences, and Friedman´s popularity 
and influence grew quickly. Friedman´s hugely successful 1962 book Capitalism and 
Freedom had granted him both national and international attention. The policy suggestions 
Friedman advocated were bold and unorthodox as he offered a blend of political philosophy, 
classical economics and history. Friedman had become a popular public intellectual. The 
scope of marketization and deregulation that Friedman boldly presented was surprising, even 
compared to his and his colleagues’ earlier work. But for many this added to the book´s 
appeal. The way Friedman framed the issue of free markets against the collectivism of the 
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Soviet Union made the book impact the political debate of the time with a broader readership 
than had been possible through economic theory alone. Friedman was unmoved by claims that 
the economic consequences of his policy suggestions were cold and amoral. For him, 
capitalism was inherently moral, therefore bureaucratic attempts to design a moral economy 
were only giving privileges to one group or another, and this was sure to be abused over time. 
Arguably, Friedman would come to influence public and intellectual thinking as much as 
Keynes and even Karl Marx.  
Friedman´s powers of persuasion were often extraordinary. Biographers have stated that 
one of his techniques for winning debates over people that did not share his view was to use 
his free market ideas not as ends in itself, but as a means to achieving other´s ends. Friedman 
often disarmed his opponents by arguing that free markets and deregulation would produce 
the very outcomes that his opponents wanted to achieve by political governance. Even though 
Friedman might be opposed to the policies suggested, the way in which he argued the free 
market would bring about the desired result often left people with the impression that he 
argued from the standpoint of economic theory and not political preferences. Friedman´s 
“methodology” contributed to the impression that his ideas and those of his circle were seen 
as not so radical in political terms, as the reins of the economy was nominally still in the 
hands of the politicians.121  
One problem subsisted, however, that had hampered the movement since its very 
beginnings. Even by the mid 60s the new liberals had not yet found a term that they could 
apply to their movement. Classic European liberalism as it was expressed in laissez-faire was 
devoid of meaning. Friedrich Hayek saw them as anachronisms; as widely diverse principles 
that had derived their labels through “historical accident”.122 “Libertarian” was also 
considered, but it was felt that this term had semantic connotations to anarchism, which was 
not seen as a “feasible social structure”. Friedman initially used the term “neoliberal” to 
describe his ideas but decided to drop this term by the late 1960s. The term that Hayek, 
Friedman and the rest of the society were least favorably inclined to was “conservative”. The 
group saw themselves as radicals, not conservatives, as conservatism implied a preservation 
of the system as it was. The problem of terminology subsisted even after Friedman’s 
Capitalism and Freedom. Arguably, this would become one of the gravest mistakes of the 
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movement, as it would later be referred to “neoliberal” – a term that certainly carries 
connotations to laissez-faire.123  
But one term the new liberals had focused on through Friedman was “freedom”. The 
Cold War ideological climate that inspired Friedman allowed him to frame his ideas of the 
free market as metaphor for freedom itself. It either freedom as represented by the USA, or 
enslavement by the state as represented by the USSR. The conceptualization of new 
liberalism in terms of a hallmark of “free society” would be one of the most important 
features of the new liberalism as it sought to discredit the state as superfluous in governing the 
activities of free individuals.  
Friedman differed, however, from his circle in his views on nineteenth century laissez-
faire. His problem with the term “liberalism” was purely one of semantics, as he though that 
Gilded Age America was “the closest approach the United States has had to true free 
enterprise capitalism”.124 Very much against the historiography of the times, which tended to 
see this period of American history as one of poverty, hardship and individual un-freedom, 
Friedman saw it as a blossoming “frontier” of capitalist innovation and prosperity that 
replaced the old bureaucratic and political America.125 He based his argument on what he saw 
as a propensity for great societies to go under when they tried to curb individual freedom. The 
arrival of bureaucracy had destroyed freedom in the ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome, 
which caused their demise. Strategically, Friedman sought to turn the biggest obstacle to the 
new liberalism - its association with the Gilded Age – to a source of strength. Friedman had 
over time abandoned the Society´s attempts to form a moderated liberalism that fixed the 
problems of laissez-faire. He straddled the border of radicalism (which usually is usually 
viewed with suspicion in America), and populism. This social philosophy would come to shift 
public discourse. Friedman would precipitate the impossible: A triumphant revival of laissez-
faire.  
The free market fundamentalism of Friedman differed from laissez-faire in one 
important aspect: Friedman´s polemical and unabashed advocacy of the ability of the market 
to solve concrete problems produced discourses on the free market that were directly positive 
and self-reflexive, rather than simply framed negatively, “against” the state. The social 
purpose was maximum individual freedom and efficiency. Negative freedom, he argued 
would bring about optimal prosperity not only t the top, but for the bottom of America´s 
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social ladder. If laissez-faire as it had developed in the United States had been first and 
foremost an approach to economic governance, Friedman´s laissez-faire represented an 
unabashed marketization of the social realm as well. The discourse of laissez-faire had been 
characterized by Neo-Darwinist attitudes to social problems. “Neoliberalism” included a 
social philosophy in the moral aspects of capitalism. Friedman’s radicalism aside, he 
recognized the need for his social philosophy to address the issue of morality. He argued that 
markets did not only facilitate efficient transactions, but by their very nature rewarded virtue. 
Their emphasis on individual responsibility would produce a citizenry that understood 
freedom in conjunction with responsibility. “It therefore tends to promote values of self-
reliance, of commitment. By ruling out at least coercion it requires emphasis on mutual 
benefit which is a far more ennobling creed than the use of force.”126 Also, if a business were 
to be motivated by altruism or socialism and not to their shareholders, it would just be 
supplanted by a more efficient business that could take its place.  
 Friedman´s logic relied on juxtaposition between the state directing on the one hand, 
and the market allowing free choice on the other. The latter constituted “participatory 
democracy”, the former was “bureaucratic democracy” as participating in democracy required 
choices, and only the market could offer real choice, rather than have the government choose 
for the citizenry. The government would tend to “sacrifice the public interest to the special 
interest”. Everybody, including the poor, was harmed when the state intervened. Wendy 
Brown has identified the extent to which the features of free market (She uses neoliberal) 
pertain more to social relations than in classical economic liberalism: 
 
The extension of economic rationality to formerly non-economic domains and institutions extends to individual 
conduct, or more precisely, prescribes citizen-subject conduct in a neo-liberal order. Whereas classical liberalism 
articulated a distinction, and at times even a tension, among the criteria for individual moral, associational, and 
economic actions... neo-liberalism normatively constructs and interpellates individuals as entrepreneurial actors 
in every sphere of life. It figures individuals as rational, calculating creatures whose moral autonomy is 
measured by their capacity for “self-care” - the ability to provide for their own needs and service their own 
ambitions.127 
 
This movement towards hegemony occurred on many levels in American society. Crucial was 
the intellectual support of Hayek and Friedman in ensuring these ideas were in circulation 
when the political climate changed. The impact of Friedman in this endeavor cannot be 
exaggerated, as his framing of the free market was able to boil complex economic ideas into a 
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narrative that resonated well with American values. His access to the corridors of power 
meant that he could influence the opinions of key policymakers in the Reagan Administration.  
The left, as defenders of the Keynesian institutional framework suffered a crushing 
series of political defeats, as Keynesian theory was powerless to address the economic woes 
of rising fuel prices, increasing unemployment and stagflation. The social democratic 
coalition had seen America through Depression, War and unprecedented broadly shared 
prosperity, but now found themselves as archaic defenders of an increasingly irrelevant 
economic system that stood in the way of not only economic progress but of realizing the 
American Dream. Reflecting a newfound dynamisms in American society, the new liberals 
(or neoliberals) was also an expression of a new American optimism and a belief that the 
setbacks and political turmoil of the late sixties and seventies were behind, and a new spring 
would come for the American people. To the extent that the logic of the new liberal economic 
program mattered to the public, the materialism of supply side economics fitted well with 
hard-pressed American families that had seen a drastic decline in purchasing power during the 
seventies. Cutting taxes both served as a way to boost the economy and provided the rationale 
for cutting government entitlement programs. In the midst of de-industrialization, the shift 
from an industrial economy to a service economy weakened the power of unions, further 
detracting the political support for the left.  
 
3.6 Institutionalization of Laissez-faire: The Reagan Revolution 
Starting in the 1980s, the American public debates were inundated with calls for a significant 
rollback of government in the economy. Against the backdrop of stagflation and increased 
economic competition, Ronald Reagan promised to get rid of the welfare sluggish welfare 
state that was hampering America´s entrepreneurial spirit.128 Keynesianism, with its policies 
of restraint was now the target of this new wave of economic liberal reformers. From an 
intellectual and public climate that distrusted the reign of free markets, the pervading feeling 
was now that government could not be trusted in the economy. The broad support towards a 
freeing market forces, and the removal of the social democratic mandate of the state was, and 
still remains, difficult for the left to fathom. Defenders of Keynesianism pointed to the logical 
inconsistencies of the free market coupled with its promises of prosperity, individual liberty 
and the preservation of American values. Critics warned of the social realities that were 
masked by a simplified and idealized commitment to the free market. The support of many 
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blue collar workers to the new “conservative” program struck Keynesians as turkeys voting 
for Christmas, as they were unlikely to benefit these groups.129 This movement can be seen as 
a narrowing down of the economic discursive “bandwidth”.  The left and right have been 
converged in character, degree and even in rhetoric.130 Political socialism was finished.  
In the translation of free market economics into a political program, free market 
discourse was adapted to re-contextualize certain myths and social imaginaries in American 
culture. These myths were mostly tapped from the individualist parts of American culture, 
self-reliance, hard work, market populism, and anti-statism.131 Central to these myths were 
their ability to fit the logic of the free market: The view of citizen as a rational, self-interested 
individual as conducive to the good of society was as such unaltered from the “invisible hand” 
theory of Adam Smith.  
Free market advocates thus engaged in the construction of an American ideal-type that 
would fit this new environment. President Ronald Reagan frequently invoked rhetoric that 
constructed the American citizenry as self-reliant and independent individuals that were 
hindered from achieving greatness by the “overweight” welfare state. The free market idea of 
citizenship shifted the emphasis from political rights to civil rights in a legal context, such as 
the freedom of speech, freedom of religion and the right to private property.132  
The success of free market discourse is in large part derived form its antagonistic 
relationship with non-market institutions - especially if these are considered “collectivist” in 
their organization. These entities were antithetical to the market in that they impeded the 
functioning of the market for producing the optimal outcome by “distorting” its logic. Labor 
unions, government agencies, and special interest groups constitute “noise” in the free market 
environment, and free market advocates framed the efforts of such groups as bureaucratic and 
inept. A discourse frequently invoked by Ronald Reagan was a re-contextualization of 
“freedom”, a term which is virtually empty as a signifier, and as such can be molded to fit a 
broad range of policies. “Freedom”, is a term that derives its meaning not from the term itself 
but form the necessary opposite that is implies, and as such was effective in Reagan´s rhetoric 
in the context of the Cold War. 
In terms of trade, Reagan staunchly advocated freedom of trade as the path to economic 
growth. In his 1988 State of the Union Address, President Ronald Reagan held:  
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One of the greatest contributions the United States can make to the world is to promote freedom as the key to 
economic growth. A creative, competitive America is the answer to a changing world, not trade wars that would 
close doors, create greater barriers, and destroy millions of jobs. We should always remember: Protectionism is 
destructionism. America's jobs, America's growth, America's future depend on trade—trade that is free, open, 
and fair.133 
 
The crisis of the Keynesian welfare-regulatory had opened up for competing ideas. 
Reagan´s message of the sluggish state resonated with the American public, frustrated by the 
economic hardships brought by stagflation. The policy prescriptions of “Reaganomics” 
characterized the following decades. The policies of economic deregulation; cuts in welfare 
entitlements programs; rejection of Keynesian management of the business cycle; and the 
advocacy of free markets became the norm for economic governance.  
 
In the mid 1990s, a new political economic compromise formed a body of ideas, which have 
been labeled “third way”. The third way consisted formally of a compromise between 
classical social democracy on from the left, and free market policies on the right.134 Described 
as “free market policies with a human face”, the “third way” differed from the laissez-faire 
platform of Reagan in that it recognized the role of the government as one not challenging 
market rule in areas of social life, but “correcting market failures” where the market failed to 
produce the desired outcome.135 In economic terms this can be understood as new-Keynesian 
approach to governing, with an emphasis on; supply-side economics that abandons the 
objective of full employment, but instead uses monetary policy to curb inflation. This 
component of some measure of activism on behalf of the state came from the political left, 
and stood in partial contrast to the laissez-faire program as the Reagan Administration has 
pursued it.136 
The provision of government services was to mimic market conditions in areas like 
education or health. The system imagined the citizen as a consumer of the public good, 
choosing the services of government like any other good. The “third way” pragmatism that 
sought to build a bridge between left and right, thus built a discursive bridge between the 
social democratic discourse of the Democratic Party, and the free market policies of the 
Republican Party. In discursive terms this allowed free market discourses to reach into social 
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democratic discourses and shape the agenda from “redistribution” to “growth”, “competition” 
and economic dynamism.137 
With the development of the “third way” compromise during the Clinton 
Administration, traditional liberal welfare politics was forced to accept the market as the chief 
allocator of resources. The discourse increasingly shifted to what kind of regulation and how 
much there should be of it. The third way approach to governance saw markets as in need of 
permanent assistance and intervention through institutions that are specially designed as being 
independent of the market. This had little effect on institutions of free market governance.138  
The early years of the Clinton Administration effectively forced policies to the right as 
the given the economic circumstances of large deficits made improving the material 
conditions of their traditional electoral base impossible without raising taxes. The political, 
economic and intellectual legacy of Reagan had left Clinton with virtually no tools to 
institutionally go back to Keynesian principles. Clinton had to abandon his ambition to 
service the more egalitarian elements of the Democratic electorate. Clinton rather attempted to 
mitigate adverse economic effects once they had occurred. By doing this Clinton effectively 
granted laissez-faire status as beyond the scope of economic politics.  
The discursive hegemony was largely established on the part of the classic centrist left 
representing the American worker was effectively shafted from the Democratic Party. This 
movement by the Clinton Administration can be seen as partly a failure to bridge the free 
market discourse with traditional Democratic values of egalitarianism.139  
Free market discourse now became the backdrop onto which all politics were 
conducted. It became clear the role of the nation-state was to take a back seat, and that Capital 
was to be given more leeway in shaping policies and hence social life. In order to become 
reelected Clinton had to fold in his political program to fit the free market ontology. In a way, 
the hegemony of free market discourse was not entirely solidified until Clinton´s third way 
made a return to a “normal capitalism” by conceding the free market as a policies of his 
predecessor, and in turn institutionalizing these policies with NAFTA. 
Although the alliance built between the conservative and those in favor of free market 
voters in 1970s America was an unlikely one from a logical perspective, they developed a 
twin discourse where conservative nationalism filled the moral gap that free market discourse 
was unable to legitimize. The resulting “moral majority´s” emphasis on cultural nationalism, 
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evangelical faith, moral responsibility and family values, combined with free market signifiers 
like “freedom (of choice)” worked in tandem with the insistence that the state was the root of 
all problems, and must be held separate from the nation.140 The more free market policies 
dissolved governmental structures, cut welfare and alienated the working class segments of 
the population, the more conservatism had to function as a social purpose and moral compass 
of the individual. The more protest and social unrest free market policy caused on the 
marginalized groups, the more “order” and religious values were needed.141The political 
alliance between these groups lasted well into the presidency of Gorge W. Bush, and 
contributed to the hegemony of free market discourse.142 This hegemony would be seriously 
challenged by the financial crisis and the ensuing recession. The financial crisis and the 
ensuing Recession brought to the fore in American politics a multitude of protests against the 
free market principles. Americans responded to the events following the Great Recession with 
outrage, which was reflected on their ballots, putting the liberal Barack Obama in office with 
a convincing margin. During the height of the crisis, dissatisfaction with the American 
economic system ceased to be a sentiment shared by a well-informed political minority, but 
was increasingly the opinion of public debate.143 In accordance with Fairclough´s theory on 
hegemonic transitions, the floor was now open to new economic ideas.  
 
3.7 Summary 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to show how a structural survey of institutions has 
influenced the American political conversation on the economy. As we saw in the earlier 
sections, the Keynesian Revolution, institutionalized by the New Deal and the subsequent 
internationalization of this regime by the Bretton Woods regime put an end to the era of 
classic liberalism. Dismissed as utopian, and unscientific the intellectual project of liberalism 
was dismantled and now resided in recalcitrant pockets of mainly non-U.S scholarly milieus. 
The political economy of laissez-faire and the discourses it had produced about the inherent 
rationality and stability of the market, and the ineptitude of state agency in the economy was 
overturned completely.  
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Later, free market ideas went from a few intellectuals and into the dominating the policy 
agenda: From obscurity to hegemony. Ideas, intellectual support and advocacy groups did 
play a significant role in bringing about the conservative turn. But material conditions were a 
key factor in all hegemonic shifts that we have discussed.144 Also the gradual nature of these 
changes should be remembered as we move on to analysis of the MCE. The New Deal 
Coalition and free market revolution were all gradual and ambiguous processes that defy the 
identification of any singular starting point. These shifts from what is considered radical into 
“conventional wisdom” have been slow, and dependent on several conditions in which merely 
one of these conditions, like the legitimacy of current arrangements, alone is insufficient to 
bring about change. This helps us appreciate the current ambivalence in regards to MCE and 
the inconclusive legacy of the financial crash of 2008.  
Indeed, economic radicals have influenced the direction of the political economy of the 
United States, but as junior associates under the establishment reformers. The political 
margins have mattered, but only to the extent to which they have been able to influence a 
political elite. The political goals that can be obtained are dependent on winning over a 
portion of establishment. Rather than a radical economic program, laissez-faire was able to 
cast itself as a return to “normality” in America. This normality was shaken by the events of 
2008.  
 
Chapter 4 
 
4.0 Post Financial Crisis Developments 
 
This chapter discusses current developments in the USA, where the argument is that free 
market principles as constituting a hegemonic discourse in is suffering from a dislocation of 
certain core principles, most notably that the state is back in areas previously considered the 
prerogative of markets. This has created ambivalence where different explanations have been 
competing for the role as the dominant (hegemonic) narrative to explain the crisis. 
Explanations have varied from incompetence, corruption, systemic breakdown or the crisis 
occurring as a natural or as an inherent feature of the economic system. Thus after the crisis a 
great subjectivity has arisen where several discourses are making truth claims.   
Also, the FTAs will be outlined in some more detail here.  
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4.1 The State Between the Private and Public 
Before we move to the analysis section we must look at the specific areas where the financial 
crisis and its aftermath have forced public intervention to the extent that supports the thesis 
assumption that “Reaganite” free market policies are no longer the guiding form of 
governance. This involves one central aspect of the free market: The role of the state in the 
economy. Most commonly, the guiding mode of thinking on the public and the private has 
been that of two separate spheres; the private is that of the market or the personal, and the 
public is that of the state. The institutional logic of these two spheres have often been 
considered as two distinctly separate spheres in political theory. Connected to these spheres 
have been the associations with a set of “virtues” that have shifted according to culture, as we 
saw in chapter 3. The post World War II welfare liberal state sought to construct the public as 
the virtuous citizenry imagined in the ideals of republicanism. Here, the public was conceived 
as an identifiable and concrete counterpart of the state, connected to the state via citizenship. 
In accordance with republican ideals, the citizenry represented first and foremost unity around 
certain political ideals, and accepted the subordination of the individual to these goals.145 The 
collapse of the postwar compromise and the economic foundations that underpinned this 
socioeconomic model entailed a shift in thinking about the state, and thus, the public. The 
inherent logic of the Thatcher/Reaganite free market policies that replaced welfare liberalism 
was based on the inherent virtue of the private sphere. The private sphere – chiefly 
represented by the market – was inherently “good” and the state was inherently “bad”. 
Margaret Thatcher’s famous comment “there´s no such thing as society”, can illustrate the 
free market fundamentalist notion of the public as wholly absorbed in the concept of the 
private sphere.146  
One of the developments that have been notable after the financial crisis has been the 
“return” of the public, but not in the social democratic sense that preceded. Instead there has 
been a hybrid kind of semi-regulation where the discourses that were connected solely to the 
market have been shifted into more areas of “public” discourse. The actors involved are those 
of the market, but the kinds of activities have shifted more to the public practices. If we look 
at the area of finance, and especially various derivatives instruments, the shift after the 
financial crisis has been that this area that previously belonged to “shadow banking“, has been 
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elevated to an area of public concern after decades of non-regulation. The same tendencies are 
seen in the climate change discourses. This development is reflected through the practices of 
exercising consumer power, or private initiatives by businesses formulated as the public good. 
Also the increasing privatization of public functions like security and military is part of this 
trend. These practices are blurring the lines between public and private into a form of 
decentralized, networked mode of liberal governance that advances policy more through 
various state and non state mechanisms than policy directed from a single public source. In 
economics, the division between private and public is no longer so much who you are or 
where you sit, but what you do (and who you do it for).  
Thus we can conceptualize the post-crisis public more as a set of practices, than the 
inhabitants in the American state.147 Practices meaning meaningful patterns of activity 
through which individuals and groups make sense of the world. This way of augmenting our 
understanding of private vs. public is also applicable to the role of citizenship – a key theme 
in this thesis. Philosopher Slavoj Zizek has identified a “cultural shift in capitalism” or simply 
the movement towards what he calls “cultural capitalism”.148 The argument goes that citizens 
no longer see their citizenship as a relationship directly with the state, but through the lens of 
the market.  
We are thus seeing the return of a “citizen-consumer” but not in the Fordist sense, as 
this new citizen consumer expects much less from the state, and more from the market. 
Democracy is seen as too slow; therefore voting with your feet or with your wallet is seen as 
more responsive to the needs of the public.  The “new citizen” is one that demands better 
products, not better democracy.149  
Meeting these needs are private entrepreneurs, NGOs and a plethora of startups who are 
attacking the areas where government is sluggish. Via new Information Communication 
Technologies these are providing information, granting access and giving voice to people – 
particularly among younger groups of voters.  
There is increasing awareness that social innovation take place in networks outside the 
state, while the state remains captive of its bureaucracy. The state has subsequently lost the 
prerogative of initiative. The states inability to address economic inequality through its 
regular levers of tax-policies demonstrates this apathy. In recent developments the market 
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empowers the citizen in a way that the state is unable to do. However, the state can 
theoretically perform much better than it is currently doing in this environment, and indeed 
managing a social crisis of the magnitude of the kind of economic inequality the U.S is 
facing, the state is an indispensible part of the solution. Indeed, since 70% of the American 
economy is driven by consumption the state is in the position to redistribute some wealth from 
the top earners to expand the middle class and thereby enable the very system that is 
providing wealth in the first place. Therefore in seeing how President Obama´s MCE 
envisions the role of the state should tell us what accounts for effective governance in 
Obama´s Administration. Who articulates the social vision in the U.S? Is it the public or is it 
the state?  
Further observations by political economists has been that in this process of re-
regulating and normalizing conditions in American economy post-crisis, the public has been 
redefined in specific ways that has identified it a much smaller group. Far from returning to a 
new liberal order conceived by Polyani, we are returning to a less democratic public than even 
that of the traditional “Fordist” conceptions of the public as governmental.150 While 
sociologist Robert Bellah identified the advent of the free market state with “a series of 
dislocations; the market from the state; the public from the private; the nation from the 
family”151, we are now increasingly experiencing the opposite: a conflation or contraction 
between the market, the public and the state into a series of networks with no obvious center. 
Therefore, the problematic that will lie at the heart of chapter five is “who counts as the 
public?” Another side to this is “what processes are acceptable as public”? What can the post 
crisis citizen expect from the state?  
 
 
4.2 Free Trade Agreements TTIP, TPP  
In order to fully understand the new domestic economic policy of the Obama 
Administration, it is necessary to analyze the global context in which Obama´s new policy is 
largely a response to. The United States is currently negotiating two major trade deals that are to 
pick up the thread from the stalled negotiations at the WTO´s Doha round. The TPP (Trans-
Pacific Partnership) is a deal between the U.S and 12 Asian countries. The TTIP (Transatlantic 
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Trade and Investment Partnership) is negotiated between the U.S and the 28-member European 
Union.  
Although three separate deals, should all of these be put in place it would create a free trade 
area that spans the globe under the regulatory standards of the United States. The TTIP and 
the TPP will constitute a regional trading zone that will encompass 75% of global GDP.  
Although the details of the negotiations are subject to utmost secrecy, what is known from 
official sources and leaked documents are that the TTIP and the TPP goes further than the 
WTO in all areas.152 The four central elements of both the FTAs content are: 
• A reduction of at-border tariffs to zero.  
• A general liberalization of financial services and investments  
• A harmonizing of regulatory standards within the trading blocs, and  
• A provision of stronger rights on intellectual property.  
 
The FTAs, if implemented, will constitute a significant mechanism by which the U.S can 
shape political and economic developments in larger parts of the global economy. Although 
the FTAs are likely to vary in content, they will make considerable advances in the area of 
services from its WTO predecessor. Indeed, border tariffs average 1.4% in the U.S under 
existing trade agreements. Therefore other so-called “non-tariff” barriers to trade are the most 
important aspects of the agreements, as these constitute the most important source of revenues 
for firms in the “information age”. Services and patent rights constitute the “underdeveloped” 
part of the WTO and this has been a frustration for the U.S ever since the negotiations at Doha 
fell apart. As services constitute 68% of U.S GDP, but between the U.S and EU, 20% of 
services are protected. In Asian countries, this number is even higher. Liberalization of 
services would thus constitute decade’s worth of WTO trade liberalization in terms of the 
volume of money.153 The deals are expected to create more legal certainty in investments 
services, and hence a better climate for investment. The attraction of investment is a key to 
the popularity of the trade deals in emerging economies.  
 However, there is suspicion that the FTAs will not lead to a raising of standards for all 
parties. The element of harmonization of regulatory standards has attracted suspicion in the 
EU, as many of the European standards for food production or car safety etc., are not as 
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stringent in the U.S compared to those of the E.U. The White House Council of Economic 
Advisers state the FTAs as “values driven”, which seeks to ensure a higher standard for all 
parties: “The Administration’s policy is to encourage trade agreements to promote a “values-
driven” trade regime that maximizes globalization’s benefits while addressing globalization’s 
problematic side-effects.”154 Enforcing these standards is delegated to an Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) body to protect investment from political intervention; similar 
institutions have been created for other trade regimes like the NAFTA-agreement or the 
WTO. The ISDS body creates the international legal provisions for investors to sue 
independent governments, something which would be legally difficult under current 
international law.  
 
4.2.1 Criticisms of the FTAs 
The FTAs have been met with great suspicion. Much of the criticism has been directed 
against the FTAs possible adverse impact on working Americans, the secrecy surrounding the 
negotiations, and the almost exclusive involvement by corporate representatives in crafting 
the agreements. In the eyes of the critics, these trade agreements, are seen as a joint corporate 
and geopolitical project that seeks to superimpose a corporatist regime over democratically 
elected institutions. Far from helping economic growth beneficial to working Americans, the 
deals open up the U.S to more foreign competition, further undermining the power of labor, as 
experience with past deals are seen to have done. For the supporters of the trade deals, they 
are seen as a welcome set of regulation that will bring transparency, accountability and 
predictability to an anarchic global economy where cheating and manipulating goes on 
unhindered.  
The ISDS has been (so far) one of the most protested aspects of the agreements for 
two reasons. Firstly, this part of the agreements has been publicly known since negotiations 
began, and thus for long has been one of the known details of the agreements. Second, 
concern has been raised because ISDS will provide an independent court system outside the 
national jurisdiction of the state in question, where corporations can file lawsuits against that 
government should its policies negatively impact corporate profits.155 The legal protection of 
investors is not just intended for the purposes of unfair treatment, but for the loss of profits by 
local regulations. The ISDS could undermine U.S democratic institutions, by offshore 
companies suing American state or federal government over the loss of profits. 
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Another criticism that has been posited has been along the lines of the “infant 
industries” argument from development studies. Here, experience has showed that the 
adoption of free trade between unequal partners has led the strong party to accrue 
disproportionate advantages. Far from being a policy for developing underdeveloped nations, 
free trade has undermined the right of the state of the weaker party to protect start-up 
industries. Trade protection is seen as something that provides an equal footing in global 
markets, rather than cheating. On the web pages of the special Trade Representative of the 
United States it reads: “Commitments ensuring SOEs [state-owned enterprises] act in 
accordance with commercial considerations and compete fairly, without undue advantages 
from the governments that own them, while allowing governments to provide support to 
SOEs that provide public services domestically.” In relation to the Trans Pacific Partnership 
where several of the U.S’ potential trading partners are not fully developed, the agreements 
are feared to produce an American walkover of infant industries.156 Especially in regards to 
the pharmaceutical industry (who is one of the sectors that have been most involved in the 
pushing for intellectual property rights) that would get stronger patent rights for generic 
drugs. The patent system, while compensating companies for medical R&D, should also 
balance profits with the interests of making life-saving drugs available to those that need it. In 
addition fears of extending patents in other areas where there has been relative freedom of 
information, like biology (crops, seeds) and creative works (books, movies, music) has been 
the target of fierce criticism from people who see the FTAs as a process of commodifying 
public goods.  
The “democratic deficit” of the deal negotiations, however, has been the main source 
of suspicion. So far the FTAs have been anything but democratic. The deliberations of the 
trade deals have been overwhelmingly a corporate discussion, and not a democratic one. In 
the case of TTIP, 92% of the consultations that have been involved in crafting the deal have 
been corporate lobbyists.157 This has raised considerable suspicions and protest by various 
groups from ant-globalization to more moderate forces on the left. Economist Paul Krugman 
called the deals a “gross mismanagement of globalization” in the NY Times. 158 The Obama 
Administration has also been met with fierce protest for betraying its Democratic Party 
constituency, which includes labor unions, environmental groups and consumer advocacy 
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groups. In the material from the White House, there is little mention on the economically 
distributive aspects of the deals, save from the elements that American businesses now can 
capitalize on better exporting opportunities, and that this will provide more high-paying jobs 
in the U.S. the fact that this might mean more competition and that some American businesses 
might lose has not been communicated thus far. The generically sanguine view of trade that 
has been put forth is typical of classical economic liberalism which holds that trade invariably 
produces benefits for all parties.159 Notwithstanding the President’s public reassurances of the 
benefits of the trade deals, the deals remain controversial. 
 
 
4.2.2 U.S Geopolitical Concerns 
As the U.S is the only party that are in both sets of negotiations – the TPP and TTIP, this will 
bring a significant geopolitical advantage for the U.S from being able to play these regions 
against each other to advance U.S interests.160 Further, although the precise economic benefits 
from these agreements are hard to predict, the White House operates with its own estimates of 
$295 billion annually for TPP and $127 billion from TTIP, respectively.161 The majority of 
this income is predicted to come from the U.S as an energy provider of fossil fuels due to the 
recent innovations in horizontal drilling techniques that have provided access to oil and gas 
resources that have previously been inaccessible.162 This is where the TPP and TTIP come in. 
They can be understood as agreements that provide gains to all parties, but relatively more 
gains to the U.S economy. The deals are a part of a geopolitical strategical shift that has been 
dubbed the “Pivot to Asia”, in the words of then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011.163 
The aim of this strategy is to achieve greater differential growth164 than U.S competitors 
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(China predominantly), which constitute a crucial source of U.S global power. That means 
growing faster than your competitors is more important than growth in absolute numbers. 
This strategy has been colloquially labeled “Let´s Run Faster”, and is broadly speaking a 
strategy of comparatively diminishing Chinese influence by a combination of forces. Here 
outlined by Ashley Tellis:  
[…]improving the efficiency and the innovative capacity of the American economy to enable the US to dominate 
the new leading sectors of the global economy; renewing the ability of the US to project its military power 
globally despite all anticipated opposition; buttressing the national power of the countries geopolitically pivotal 
for balancing China […] so as to amplify the constraints on Beijing’s capacity to misuse its power and provide 
Washington with a local first line of defense; and, finally, to erect a new institutional overlay on the multilateral 
trading system that would enable the US and its friends to correct the losses suffered from China’s imperfect 
entry into the liberal trading order while at the same time enhancing their own gains from trade.165 
 
While in terms of soft power resources, America´s standing in world opinion has greatly 
improved under President Obama, fears of “decaying American power” in the U.S have not 
receded.166 A broad range of critics has attacked President Obama for not having a global 
strategy and for being flimsy in regard to U.S foreign policy. Prominent economic historian 
Niall Fergusson stated in an article in Newsweek that the U.S’ failure to control negative 
developments in the Middle East were “the predictable consequence of the Obama 
administration's lack of any kind of a coherent grand strategy, a deficit about which more than a 
few veterans of U.S. foreign policymaking have long worried.”167 Thus, there exists no “Obama 
Doctrine” that states a clear-cut mission for the United States, as it did for his predecessor 
George Bush.  
However, the absence of an articulated grand strategy should not mean that the Obama 
Administration is absent a geopolitical strategy. True, if we accept Daniel Drezner´s definition 
of a grand strategy as a “clear articulation of national interests married to a set of operational 
plans for advancing them”, then we can say that Obama has not yet articulated such a 
strategy.168 Notwithstanding the absence of such a strategy, actions sometimes speak louder 
than words, as is often the case in great power politics. It should be remembered that Obama has 
not fundamentally changed the direction of American power after his predecessor. In terms of 
action the Obama administration has provided strong indications in policies and reform 
suggestions that deploys power more “smart” but no less forceful in key areas of interest. 
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Obama´s “pivot to Asia” remains a strategic rule, and TPP cannot be seen as separate from 
American containment policies against China.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
As we will see in the next chapter, China represents a powerful symbol in the “American 
decline” discourse, and China’s embarking on a series of institution building initiatives in 
Asia parallel and apart from institutions where the U.S wields influence is generating 
considerable concerns in Washington. Despite the FTAs objective to include many large 
Asian economies under a new trading regime, TPP in fact excludes the U.S’ second biggest 
trading partner – China. As a part of a strategy that aims to create new opportunities for the 
American middle class through exports this strikes one as perhaps conflicting. If Obama 
wants to help the middle class by opening up new markets for American goods, the 
Administration is alienating one of the potential biggest markets in the world. The choice of 
the Obama Administration to lump the strategical shift to Asia and MCE together in one 
group of policies to save the American middle class is thus a demanding sell. However, the 
FTAs serve a moral purpose that underlies President Obama’s vision of the American people 
as a moral and hardworking people in relation to the outside world. This will be explored in 
the next chapter.  
 
This chapter has outlined the FTAs and discussed them as a parallel development to MCE. It 
is important to note the potential conflicting messages in championing further trade 
liberalization which despite its rhetoric seems like a corporate project absent democratic 
voices. The skepticism in the U.S against “big business” and further economic liberalization 
makes these. Enough knowledge exists about the trade deals to render the form of them 
visible. And the form cannot be said to contain any new economic or social provisions that are 
not grounded in the generic belief in free markets that hold that trade liberalization benefits all 
parties.169 Therefore the domestic part of Obama’s economic program can be seen as the part 
that will help the middle class by enabling them to better take advantage of the new trading 
regime.  
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Chapter 5 Analysis 
 
5.1 Negotiating Tensions Between the Universal and the Particular 
 
Returning to the theorizations of Karl Polyani and John Ruggie, and the writings of Hayek, we 
can identify that one of the core assumptions of the advocates for a free market society has 
been the conception of market “universality” – the spontaneous, natural and benign nature of 
markets. This rests on three assumptions: First, markets, left to their own devices, collect 
information most efficiently. Thus no politician or government regulatory agency can “know 
better” than the market does through price signals Secondly, the market will provide optimal 
resource allocation, thus ensuring social welfare by optimizing society’s resources. Lastly, that 
all market participants will through competition converge on the correct economic model. This 
means that there will eventually be only one way of organizing an economy once this “optimal 
mode” has been arrived at. This is what “new classical” economic theory calls “rational 
expectations hypothesis”. 170 In other words, markets are inherently efficient, conducive to 
optimal outcomes, and they are the inevitable and only way of social organization.   
 This renders the state and cultural aspects insignificant, and places tremendous 
importance in the global economic sphere. The logic that springs form this theory on 
universality means that contrary to claims to “neutrality”, markets as the supreme organizing 
principle of any society can be seen as highly normative. Indeed, this was Keynes’ and other 
welfare liberalists’ main critique of the free market society: It ignored the social dimension of 
economic behavior. Any sense of morality or irrationality (which he called “animal spirits) 
dissolved in treating the market mechanisms as external to society. Keynes sought to 
minimize the power of the individual economic agent in the market by subjecting markets to 
state management, thereby striking a balance between the global markets and the local 
economic context. The implications of the trade deals by The White House may be said to 
come down on the side of new classical economy, as nearly all advantages from trade arise 
from the market mechanism associated with the Ricardian “comparative advantage”. Here, 
trade is held to naturally increase productivity and innovation. But also, it acknowledges the 
role of the state to shape globalization through policies mitigating the adverse effects of free 
global markets. Despite the best intentions, it may be fair to state that MCE is about creating 
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an innovative middle class, than it is expanding the middle class downwards. From the 2015 
Report: 
 
The process of globalization offers many new economic opportunities, but it also has created challenges. 
Globalization is a result of both worldwide economic developments and specific policy changes. Analyzing 
globalization’s general impact is different from analyzing any particular trade agreement. Understanding the 
impact of any particular agreement requires both historical research, as well as an analysis of the relative tariffs 
of trading partners, NTBs, and the relevant standards (for instance, labor, environment, and intellectual 
property). 
Nevertheless, historical experience does underscore the potentially large gains from trade. In the past half-
century, as trade barriers around the world have diminished, these gains have multiplied and are increasingly 
shared across different countries and different industries. Among these classic gains from trade are lower prices 
for consumers and producers, greater variety of goods and services available for purchase, enhanced 
productivity, and increased innovative activity.171 
 
When analyzing economic publications from The White House and numerous independent 
articles, there is little consideration to the potential wage depression of these deals. Worker’s 
wages as seen to only rise as access to export-oriented jobs increase, as these jobs generally 
pay better than firms that produce for the domestic market only. There is little reflection upon 
increased competition becoming a force driving wages down, or that the non-export businesses 
might be adversely affected by the FTAs. On economic inequality the 2015 Report holds a 
very sanguine outlook in the ability of the agreements to act as a force for good by virtue of its 
regulatory provisions:  
 
Any particular agreement must be assessed based on an analysis of its tariff provisions, its reduction of NTBs 
[non-tariff barriers] to exports, and its provisions that promote higher standards. This can lead to a quite different 
outcome than globalization more broadly. Labor and environmental protections in trade agreements, in 
particular, would likely push in the opposite direction of globalization-driven increases in inequality.172 
 
Interestingly, the 2015 and 2014 Reports reveal striking similarities with the 1994 Economic 
Report to President Clinton in reference to the NAFTA negotiations. NAFTA too was intended 
as a establishing a regulatory regime that would curb abuse, boost economic growth and avoid 
a “race to the bottom”. As with MCE, domestic policies aimed at retaining the technological 
and productive advantage over competitors were issued in parallel to NAFTA to bolster the 
American worker. Consider this corresponding passage form the 1994 Economic Report to the 
President: 
 
Realizing this goal requires that America compete not on the basis of lower wages, but on the basis of superior 
productivity, technology, and quality. It also requires that our trade policy be complemented by domestic 
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policies designed to increase labor force skills and facilitate the adjustment of American workers and 
communities to changing economic circumstances—whatever their source.173 
 
Now, the legacy of NAFTA in regard to the American middle class specifically is mixed, but 
its effects on the working class Americans have been devastating.174 The effects of the 
domestic social policies to weigh up for increased competition in manufacturing did not benefit 
the “blue-collar” worker in the short run. On an a priori basis, it is understandable that the TPP 
and TTIP are met with skepticism by working class interests in America, as MCE offers the 
exact same remedy for avoiding a “race to the bottom”. The emphasis is on “worker 
flexibility”, “re-training” and “dynamism”, which will “give our workers the tools they need to 
compete in an ever-changing world”.175 This flexibility coupled with the provision of increased 
social security is reminiscent of Clinton’s rhetoric connected to the NAFTA deals. If we 
consider that the intensions of MCE to provide for increased social welfare net, then this might 
stop the bottom from dropping from under the economy. However, the government’s ability to 
stimulate a “dynamic” workforce may be overestimated. In addition, at the time of NAFTA, 
the U.S retained much more of a competitive edge against its trade counterparts, plus NAFTA 
covered relatively fewer trading partners in terms of dynamisms and productivity than in 
today’s global economy. At a speech delivered at the City Club of Cleveland Ohio on March 
18, 2015, President Obama has uses the phrase these trade deals “haven’t always lived up to 
the hype”. This is the preferred phrase that Obama uses when he introduces the FTAs. The 
objective is to acknowledge and defuse arguments comparing the trade deals to NAFTA:176 
“We can keep our exports and protect our workers with a strong new trade deal – first in Asia, 
then in Europe – that are not just free but also fair.” […] Here in Ohio you saw fist hand that a 
lot of past trade deals didn´t live up to the hype”.177 
 
As the details of the FTAs are kept secret, one must simply believe the president bona fide 
committed to regulations that will prevent a “race to the bottom”. Nevertheless, we can say this 
represents a partial rejection of free market assumptions that unbridled free trade is generically 
of the good, and this opens up for the normative aspects of the specific deals to be discussed. 
The role of the state is to shape globalization so as to produce gains for the local communities. 
                                                
173 1994 Economic Report to the President (The American Presidency Project) p.206 
174 Robert E. Scott, ”The High Price of Free Trade”, The Economic Policy Institute, (2003) 
175 Weekly Address: Fighting for Trade Deals that Put American Workers First (YouTube); 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RN4pfxOtdxk#t=55  
176 The President uses this rhetoric on at least four separate occasions in published speeches. Here found in: Weekly Address: Fighting for 
Trade Deals that Put American Workers First (YouTube) 
177 Remarks by the President at the Ohio City Club March 18, 2015 (The White House) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/03/18/remarks-president-city-club-cleveland Accessed September 11, 2015 
67 
 
In terms of its blend of discourses, MCE seeks to strike a balance between these two by 
adopting a “third way” approach between the market tensions and local autonomy. The 
problematic relationship arises when one considers who will represent the “local”, as the TPP 
and the TTIP Dispute Settlement Mechanism are multinational institutions staffed by corporate 
representatives. This will serve to lift decision-making power in economic matters out from the 
state and federal court systems, and surrender the interpretation of justice to the logic of capital 
and profits.  
In order to present this as a legitimate project, a “bottom-up” narrative is created. 
Supporting this narrative is a type of identity politics that seeks to put a “face” on the FTAs. 
These seek to connect the middle-class policies to specific identities of young entrepreneurs 
who are market participants, but also concerned. Amongst these are The White House home 
page features a blog that features American business-owners who are sending in their personal 
endorsements on the benefits the FTAs. The site is called “the list”, and is found under the 
heading “I’m an Ambassador for Better Trade”178 
One of the two samples in this section is an email contribution from owner of a small 
business called “The Pro´s Closet” that makes bike parts in Colorado. The two letters in this 
section feature very overt promotional discourse by Martin, the young and fresh looking 
owner. The sub-header reads: “Nick Martin is the co-founder of The Pro's Closet, an online 
used-cycling business. He sent the following email to the White House list to highlight why a 
better trade deal means a brighter future for online businesses like his.” The type of 
promotional discourse engages in a variety of constructions of “homeliness” and “dynamic 
local communities” and other reassuring messages to persuade the viewer of the benign effects 
of the TPP deal. “The Trans-Pacific Partnership isn't just President Obama's proposed trade deal -- it's 
mine, too. It's a trade deal that millions of other online small business owners in this country would be 
proud to add their name to.”179 
 
This type of narrative is found in much of the sampled material from the Obama 
Administration. Such language lets the user know that the trade deals are not just the project of 
the corporate elite, but represents the execution of the will of small business America, many of 
which sector as middle class. This seeks to gives democratic legitimacy to a project that has 
been seen as advancing the special interests of the well-to-do:  
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International customers aren't just good for business abroad; they’re great for my Colorado communities. Why? 
Because selling in more markets means I can hire more people here at home. In fact, more small businesses are 
using the Internet to grow their business by reaching new customers they couldn't reach before.180 
 
President Obama´s rhetoric is not only reacting to reality as he sees it. Such a view 
disregards the active constituting function of discourse. The moral discourse that President 
Obama is constructing through discourse can serve to shape certain types of behavior on the 
part of the agents in this economy. In this respect, the moral economy discourse seeks in large 
measure to transform the function of the economy independent of its structures. In line with 
observations on American society that have held that community values have checked the 
negative effects of American free market arrangements formulated by Alexis de Tocqueville 
as “the principles of self-interest properly understood.”181. Indeed, this tension between 
individualism and community has been the object of concern, admiration and analysis since 
the founding of America. This emphasis on moral community and social capital has often 
been seen as one of the pillars of American society. Social capital, a term that Robert Putnam 
brought into vogue is described as: “features of social organization, such as networks, norms, 
and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”182 President Obamas 
economic model is couched in the rhetoric of the economy as constitutive of “us”. As the 
American public’s trust in government has been on the decline this is an important 
consideration. Obama’s MCE aims to re-build trust – both and towards the state, and between 
Americans.183 Economic inequality is connected with declining social capital, and Obama´s 
rhetoric serves to remind Americans that the nature of an economy is mutually beneficial: 
“We believed that sensible regulations could prevent another crisis, shield families from ruin, 
and encourage fair competition.”184 
 
With the use of communitarian discourse, the tensions between the international and domestic 
pressures are reconciled. More jobs at home means a more thriving community. Repeating the 
President´s formulations: That is why it is so important that we secure the Trans-Pacific 
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Partnership, a new kind of trade agreement that will ensure America writes the rules and levels 
the playing field for online businesses and American workers […]185 
 
In order to fit the traditionally contradictory logics of pursuing trade liberalization and 
protecting the middle-class, the Obama Administration is deploying a series of rhetorical 
techniques to increase the legitimacy of his agenda. There are conspicuous absences from the 
picture painted which arouse doubt about the intentions for creating a type of embedded 
liberalism that can negotiate between global competition and beneficial outcomes on both 
sides. There is little mention of the word “corporations” as benefactors of the FTA´s in any of 
the sampled material on TTIP and TPP. However the word “worker” is used routinely, helping 
present the trade agreements as a project for the working middle class. Surely, the idea is not to 
construct a free trade zone from the Caucasus to Asia as a project to support unionization? 
Also, decidedly tones down, is the aspect of these agreements as a global competition. 
The competition discourse, which predominantly belongs in free market discursive formations, 
will be the objects of the next section. However, the FTAs shift the rhetoric towards a 
“workers” “playing by the rules”, and “fairness” in a distinctively conservative discourse. The 
element of competition is reformulated and replaced with “protection”. Presumably, the 
American workers will not just be getting “access to 95% of the worlds customers”, but also 
correspondingly big share of the worlds producers?  
Moreover, the “level playing field” formulation is never used in the context that it may 
be companies within the U.S who are cheating. Indeed, as the financial crisis revealed, 
corporate moral hazard endangered the American economy from within the country. Thus, the 
MCE as a part of a fairer globalization project is based on the assumption that the U.S partners 
are the only cheaters under the current arrangements, and that the rest of the world must be 
brought up to U.S standards. The only advantages that are to accrue the U.S are material in 
nature. This lack of self-reflection is highly paternalistic and post-colonial in sentiment as it 
carries with it a sense of creating economic liberalism from the top-down. A set of Western, 
universal norms are to bring the world up to our standards, thereby folding in a long tradition 
of the IMF and the World Bank of imposing a universal set of standards that are formulated in 
Washington on emerging economies.186 As well as remaining silent on abuses by corporate 
America, that, paradoxically, MCE is supposedly put in place to fix at home. Although 
presented as a project of “embedded liberalism” in the Ruggian sense, based on the 
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information we possess at the moment, it seems unlikely that a “glorious compromise” like that 
of the post-was era can be forged by TPP, TTIP and TISA. For that it simply is too far 
removed from democratic institutions, and seeks to place too few restrictions on the flow of 
capital, and allows too little national autonomy – the President’s rhetoric notwithstanding.  
Thus we can perhaps move to the next section with a definition of “embedded 
neoliberalism” as the normative social purpose of which “fairness” will be decided within the 
new American trade regime. According to Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, embedded neoliberalism 
can be defined as: “neoliberal inasmuch as it emphasizes the primacy of global market forces 
and the freedom of transnational capital. Yet, as a result of such processes, markets become 
increasingly disconnected from their post-war national social institutions.” 187 However, there 
are certain modifications from laissez-faire inasmuch as the FTAs and MCE identify the 
middle class and economic downsides of unchecked markets.  
 
5.2 The State Between Markets and Welfare 
 
Now that we have determined some discursive differences between MCE and its free market 
predecessor in regards to how the international regime envisions the role of the U.S 
government in relationship with the international financial architecture, we turn to how MCE 
sees state responsibilities vis-à-vis its citizens. How does this depart, if at all, from free 
market conceptualizations of citizenship? A core discourse in free market fundamentalism 
concerns the legitimacy of government activity in the national economy. This discourse 
defines the political rights and duties of citizens of the nation. As has been stated, political 
culture in America has traditionally been more favorable to liberal economic policies than 
many European countries. However, the content and form of American liberalism has 
changed considerably, as discussed in chapter 3. Therefore the way liberalism is defined is a 
prime focus of this section. The period of welfare liberalism that preceded the market 
liberalizations of the 1980s reserved the role for the U.S government as an active player in 
shaping economic outcomes, and as a provider of certain economic rights to all citizens. The 
citizens’ economic well being was connected to the state via the Keynesian countercyclical 
deficit spending, the War on Poverty, affirmative action initiatives, and federally funded 
welfare programs like AFDC (Aid for families with Disabled Children), and Social Security. 
All this was paid for by high tax rates, and an especially high marginal top tax rate. With the 
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advent of the free market policies under Reagan, many of these initiatives by the state were 
rolled back on, and the responsibilities for economic welfare transferred to civil society and 
to the private market. Taxes were cut in several rounds, and the top income earners’ tax rates 
dropped from 70% before Reagan took office to 28% in 1986.188 Reagan famously said: 
“Government is not the solution to our problem. Government is the problem.”189  
In terms of discourse, then, free market hegemonic formations can be identified in 
certain key nodal points that define the scope of state activity. We saw in chapter 3 that the 
importance for a new economic discourse to be accepted it had to conceptualize a version of 
“liberty” that is attractive under given circumstances, as such terms are powerful in American 
culture and serve as empty signifiers which are obvious sites of discursive contestation. 
As discussed, MCE departs from the Reagnite free market policies is its recognition of 
some of the limitations of markets in producing beneficial social outcomes, and of the return 
of a normative self-reflexivity of that characterized the Keynesian welfare state. This brings 
us to the conception of citizenship. Citizenship has been described by Colin Hay as the 
“relationship between the state and civil society, as expressing the obligations and duties of 
the individual ‘citizen’ within civil society to the state, and of the state to its ‘subjects’”.190 
When tracing this definition to the hegemonic economic discourses that constitute the 
framework of this thesis, we see that MCE departs from free market conceptions of 
citizenship especially in the areas of welfare and infrastructure.  
In American culture, welfare liberalism and free market liberalism have varying 
expressions of citizenship, but have usually converged on the same general goal of providing 
maximum security and material well being for its citizens, while retaining individual choice 
as much as possible regarding the kinds of goals one wants to pursue. The differences have 
been how and by whom governance will be provided within this framework. One of the 
legacies of the Progressive movement has been the belief in technological and scientific 
advances for the betterment of social conditions, and that these factors can be brought to bear 
on this process. During the period of welfare liberalism, the state gained unprecedented 
capacities to act on behalf of what it defined as the public interest. Given the hegemony of 
Keynesianism and the historical circumstances that gave rise to the New Deal coalition, this 
resulted in the expansion of welfare and the creation of a notion of citizenship that was very 
public and political. Free market liberalism, suspicious of this type of citizenship that relied 
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too much on the state for economic “favors”, constructed expressions of citizenship that was 
private and moral. Arguably, this conception of economic citizenship has continued 
throughout the Presidency of George W. Bush. The huge budget surpluses of the economic 
boom under Clinton was not to be used to increase Social Security, but to come in the form of 
tax cuts on the wealthy. The view on the market as legitimate provider of economic security 
persisted as a bipartisan consensus throughout this period, and has only been the subject of 
political discussion after 2008.191 
The policies of the Obama Administration mark something of a break with earlier focus 
on austerity and welfare. Free market liberalism’s insistence on the corrupting influence of 
welfare as “creating a permanent underclass dependent on the state” has been a discourse that 
has tended to hold welfare as an absolute expense of the state, and not a source of saving 
money in a socioeconomic perspective. Upon analyzing economic data form The White 
House; especially after the Administration articulated the MCE program, the discourses of 
MCEs economics are very social. It identifies the role of social policies in making business 
more effective, and making macroeconomic sense. MCE connect social welfare and 
economic growth, whereas the free market discourses in its insistence that markets produced 
automatically the optimal outcome, failed to see the macroeconomic benefits of a social 
economic policy. Consider Ronald Reagan´s 1986 State of the Union Address, on the role of 
the state:  
 
As we work to make the American dream real for all, we must also look to the condition of America's families. 
Struggling parents today worry how they will provide their children the advantages that their parents gave them. 
In the welfare culture, the breakdown of the family, the most basic support system, has reached crisis 
proportion.192 
 
Welfare is here seen as a threat to not only to the economy, but also to family values. 
Conversely, MCE is centered on providing families with an economic safety net, and also 
connect this form of welfare to sound economic policies. The President´s proposals 
recognizes the need for employers to adopt more flexible work policies that seek to recognize 
that modern families do not always have a stay-at-home parent. Therefore it is necessary to 
provide for a more social work policy.  
Also, free market discourse is not without conception of the unfortunate in society. 
However, the difference is as noted one of whose job it is. Relieving of the suffering of the 
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poor is private virtue, not as government responsibility. Reagan: “It´s time to reject the notion 
that advocating government programs is a form of personal charity.”193 
Increasingly, empirically minded economists are realizing that the provision of a safety 
net will not discourage innovation or mushroom the state´s outlays, but those economists who 
are not of this conception inform usually free market discourses. Welfare is good for 
business. As the 2015 Report concludes that “[…] research suggest that work-family friendly 
policies have significantly improved worker performance in firms and industries that have 
tried them.”194 
The formulation of this sentence conveys almost genuine surprise to make that 
discovery. Nevertheless, MCE is a step forward in this direction, even though many of its 
policy recommendations will not be implemented by at the Federal level. The increasing 
realization in the U.S that providing a social economy is necessary in a modern society is a 
significant departure from past policy, and can have implications for the rest of the world. 
The 2014 and 2015 Economic Reports to the Presidents devote significant attention to the 
need for the re-introduction of welfare arrangements that make workplaces “family friendly”. 
MCE recognizes that welfare is not only compatible with economic growth; it is a cause 
economic growth. Therefore the view of welfare as leading to “big” governments, or growing 
deficits is logically and rhetorically contested: 
 
Paid leave and workplace flexibility hold great potential to benefit businesses as well as our economy overall 
through improved economic productivity. A body of research finds that these practices can benefit employers by 
improving their ability to recruit and retain talent, lowering costly worker turnover, and minimizing loss of firm-
specific skills and human capital, as well as by boosting morale and worker productivity.195 
 
One trend that can be taken as an indication of a discursive shift in U.S economic 
circles is the increasing fascination, if not attraction with Scandinavian social democratic 
models, and Germany and other European countries is increasingly heard by policymakers. 
President Obama in the 2015 State of the Union Address: 
 
Today, we are the only advanced country on Earth that doesn’t guarantee paid sick leave or paid maternity leave 
to our workers. Forty-three million workers have no paid sick leave - 43 million. Think about that. And that 
forces too many parents to make the gut-wrenching choice between a paycheck and a sick kid at home.196 
 
                                                
193 Quoted in: Bellah et.al, Habits of the Heart, 263 
194 2015 Report, 192. 
195 2015 Report, 197 
196 SOTU 2015 
74 
 
This American “lagging behind” discourse is usually accompanied by comparisons to other 
countries’ welfare systems. An American President that compares the U.S to the rest of the 
world and finds it wanting more in a State of the Union Address can be said to be a novelty 
indeed and a comment on American exceptionalism in adjustment.197  
Although there is decidedly a partisan split on this issue today in America, the recent 
growth in the American economy means that President Obama does not have to make the 
kind of choices that Bill Clinton had to make in terms of abandoning welfare at the start of 
his term. MCE recognizes that to attract the kinds of hi-tech middle class exporting jobs it 
wants for America, the state should provide more in terms of welfare. Also, this policy 
recognizes the needs of a “modern” family that usually has two breadwinners thus a sick 
child will keep one working parent from going to work. Public funds for family-friendly 
policies are seen as crucial to enhance productivity of the modern family.  
 
Connected to the “lagging behind” discourse is the recognition of the poor state of 
Americas infrastructure. Arguably, all kinds of economic discourse recognize the need for 
modern infrastructure. The problems arise when the debate turns to how to pay for upgrades. 
MCE aims to invest in America´s infrastructure, and sees this as a hindrance towards U.S 
advancement economically, and to facilitate for middle class jobs. Thus, President Obama is 
forcing a conversation on tax reform. The most pronounced parts of his tax proposals are to 
simplify the tax code. This means ending many of the special tax laws like the “carried 
interest” and “capital gains” clauses that have provided profitable loopholes for corporations 
and hedge funds with capital income.198 This is a sensitive point for the free market Right, 
who are invoking the “rich guy populism” discourse in defense of the current byzantine tax 
code.199 Nevertheless, as a part of MCE, the state returns to a Keynesian principle of taxing 
more and fiscal spending over the federal budget to provide infrastructure and facilitate for 
economic growth in the future. 
 John Kenneth Galbraith gives insight into this conflict in the book The Affluent Society 
(1958) where he talks about great private wealth and public poverty coexisting in American 
postwar society.200 The problem is to achieve a “social balance”, where some of the gains in 
the economy are channeled towards the provision of public services like the building of 
roads, bridges, schools, and disposal of waste etc. The deficiencies in public services first 
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impact those at the economic bottom of society, while those at the top often do not need the 
state to perform these functions as they use these services in the private market.201 In order 
for public spending to rise, Obama will have to do this through fiscal policy as well as 
monetary policy. However, free market advocates have traditionally been very skeptical to 
the use of fiscal policy to stimulate economic activity, as this involves state acting in the 
economy in ways that undermine the scope of markets. Therefore, the free market policy 
solution has been through monetary policy, which gives places this responsibility at the hands 
of the Federal Reserve – a bastion of private power in the U.S. Nevertheless, MCE, envisions 
the American state to perform a much more hands-on approach to economic policy than 
previously.  
However, whereas the Keynesian welfare liberalism recognized that unemployment 
was an intrinsic feature of the business cycle, The Obama Administration´s conception of 
welfare and the economic rights of the citizen differs. MCE partially reinforces the notion 
that markets are more democratic than governments. The restoration of the idea that the 
market will serve as moral and just if people are willing to work hard is still a key component 
in MCE. This notion is what sociologist Thomas Frank has called “market populism”, and 
MCE is not challenging this central aspect in free market discourses.202 Barack Obama in the 
2015 Address:  
 
Now, these ideas won’t make everybody rich, won’t relieve every hardship. That’s not the job of government. 
To give working families a fair shot, we still need more employers to see beyond next quarter’s earnings and 
recognize that investing in their workforce is in their company’s long-term interest203 
 
MCE sees the state as performing a supporting role in the market, by providing services that 
making better use of America´s human resources. However, not all human resources are 
devoted equal attention in MCE. It can be observed how the MCE policies render invisible 
the chronically poor or unemployed. In a program that champions social mobility, there is 
little mention of active policies on poverty relief, thus revealing a potential blind spot of 
MCE. In the White House data, these groups are the limited responsibility of the state, as they 
do not belong in the myth of the middle class as “responsible” individuals with a “calculating 
effort to move up the ladder.” The level of ambition in MCE does not extend to the 
chronically poor in America.  
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MCE is not a return to social democratic American of the post-war era, but a step 
towards identifying working American citizens as having intrinsic economical value outside 
of the market. In economic terms MCE envisions the role of the state and the citizen as one 
where the citizen can expect better services in the form of welfare and infrastructure from the 
state. The cost is higher taxes, but this is predominantly born by the wealthy through the tax 
reform. The new concept of welfare in MCE emphasizes more flexibility than the Keynesian 
post-war conceptions of top-down welfare. MCE creates a link between performance and 
welfare, thus aims to predominantly target the working middle class. Unlike traditional social 
democracy of the Keynes era MCEs conception of welfare is conditional on work in order to 
be sustainable. This can be summed up in as scholar Anthony Giddens commented on 
President Clinton’s welfare policies: “there can be no rights without responsibilities”.204  
 
 
5.3 Identifying a “New Citizen” 
 
Building from the previous section on citizenship, we can now move to the more social 
constructivist part of identify through discourse what kinds of citizens are created through 
MCE. This section analyzes MCE as a discursive project aimed at bringing about social change 
by producing certain mythologies. In Laclau and Mouffe´s terminology, “middle class” serves 
as a myth. Since WWII, this myth it has been one of the most important in American society. 
More than a material statement, it serves as a proxy for “America” itself. It is seen as an all-
encompassing process of “escalation” which will eventually involve everyone.205 According to 
Robert Bellah, the middle class myth represents a form of individualism that is “defined not 
merely by the desire for material betterment but by a conscious, calculating effort to move up 
the ladder of success.”206  
The term “middle class” is thus a fluid signifier that is a site for discursive antagonism 
between welfare liberalism and free market liberalism. In American culture, the concept 
“middle class” can be said to encompass both lower- and upper class values. According to 
Bellah this is because “lower class people explain their inferior position in terms of 
circumstances that have prevented them from behaving in a middle class fashion.” While the 
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upper class take comfort in the middle class sense of family and tradition, and will not attempt 
to impose their dominant values in these institutions.207 Therefore, in order for middle class 
economics to represent the groups President Obama wants to reach, it is necessary for to 
connect “middle class” signifier to something particular to construct a mythology.  
President Obama carefully constructs such a myth in the 2015 Sate of the Union.  
First, we have a clear discourse of the Americans as a people that have been “tried and tested”:  
 
Seven years ago, Rebekah and Ben Erler of Minneapolis were newlyweds. She waited tables. He worked 
construction. Their first child, Jack, was on the way. […] “If only we had known” […]what was about to happen 
to the housing and construction market. 
As the crisis worsened, Ben’s business dried up, so he took what jobs he could find, even if they kept him on the 
road for long stretches of time. Rebekah took out student loans and enrolled in community college, and retrained 
for a new career. They sacrificed for each other. And slowly, it paid off. They bought their first home. They had 
a second son, Henry. Rebekah got a better job and then a raise.  Ben is back in construction -- and home for 
dinner every night. 
“It is amazing,” Rebekah wrote, “what you can bounce back from when you have to…we are a strong, tight-knit 
family who has made it through some very, very hard times.” [Repeats] We are a strong, tight-knit family who 
has made it through some very, very hard times.208 
 
The analogy Rebekah and Ben: America has made it through some very hard times and 
sacrificed only to emerge stronger and more together. Therefore crisis has not separated 
America - it strengthened America into a tight-knit family. The fact that the Erlers have 
recovered from crisis stronger than before symbolizes that America is stronger. Both America 
and the Erlers are the casualties of seemingly arbitrary movements in the housing market, to 
which President assigns no explicit agency, but from which the state should offer protection.  
According to Slavoj Zizek, in order for a discourse to become hegemonic, it must 
successfully link the universal and the particular. Consider the effectiveness of Ronald 
Reagan´s archetype of the “welfare queen”. Rather than seeing the typical welfare recipient 
as a lower income woman with health issues, struggling to support a family, welfare 
recipients could be cast in the cynical and lazy image of the welfare queen, laughing all the 
way to bank and collecting numerous welfare checks. The effectiveness of this narrative 
points to the efficacy of the “typical”.209 The narrative of “Rebekah and Ben Erler of 
Minneapolis” functions as a myth of American identity, and is represented as “we” as people 
of considerable fortitude. Also clear from this narrative, is the unpredictable nature of the 
economy. Therefore, being flexible by “re-tooling” and “re-training” is key to succeed in an 
ever-changing world. Moreover the economy and the market are void of agency, meaning 
                                                
207 Bellah et.al, Habits of the Heart, 151. 
208 SOTU 2015, Paragraph 11-13. 
209 Slavoj Zizec, The Universal Exception. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2006), 172-173. 
78 
 
that the state can only offer partial protection, in accordance with the MCEs notion of 
citizenship. Therefore it is necessary to keep up with the competition, and adapt to changing 
circumstances to have economic security.  
 MCE has an explicit focus on boosting exports as a means of achieving such 
economic security. One of the key appeals in MCE is for workers to choose jobs that rely on 
exports. The rationale for this aspect is seen on the White House website:  
 
Right now, there are 525 million middle class consumers in Asia alone. By 2030, there are expected to be 3.2 
billion middle class consumers there, more than 8 times the size of what the U.S. market is expected to be then. 
Whose goods and services are these consumers going to buy? Who will have access to their markets? And who 
will set the international standards that define how the world does trade? 
If it’s not America, it’s going to be competitors like China. That can’t be better for our workers, our businesses 
and our values. We're in a race to secure a trade deal for the fastest growing markets in the world. And right now, 
this is the choice before us.210 
 
Thus in order to make more money the American worker must start exporting more. The 
President constructs a discourse of the American worker as inherently export oriented: 
“Twenty-first century businesses, including small businesses, need to sell more American 
products overseas. Today, our businesses export more than ever, and exporters tend to pay 
their workers higher wages.”211 The encouragement for entering in the global competition in 
MCE is not just for adults. Kids should learn how to be savvy competitors: “We believed we 
could prepare our kids for a more competitive world. And today, our younger students have 
earned the highest math and reading scores on record. Our high school graduation rate has hit 
an all-time high. More Americans finish college than ever before.”212 
 
As commented by Fairclough and others is the way in which a “business ontology” as a trait 
of free market hegemony has over the last thirty years expanded to incorporate public 
institutions and their discourses and imposed free market governmentalities in for example 
healthcare, the justice system, immigration policies. Particularly education has been a part of 
this trend, and here the Obama Administration is no less ambitious. One of the most 
noticeable free market discourses in MCE is the fusion between education- and free market 
market discourses, combining in a “competition” discourse that tends to see education solely 
in the context of a competition in the global market. This particular view of education is 
based on a set of ideas about the world as a competition between nations for the “best brains”. 
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Critics have voiced concerns about this approach to education, saying it leads to utilitarian 
and short-term thinking on education, and discourage risk taking.213214 This philosophy on 
education is both in idea and praxis a New Public Management approach, that is a public 
version of market modes of governance.  
While it has been recognized that education is one of the best ways in which to combat 
economic inequality, the emphasis on education in President Obama´s Policies are very much 
those of education as “competition”. 215 Moreover, the stakes in the competition are not only 
personal, but the fate of the American nation hangs in the balance: 
 
 […] to make sure folks keep earning higher wages down the road, we have to do more to help Americans 
upgrade their skills. America thrived in the 20th century because we made high school free, sent a generation of 
GIs to college, trained the best workforce in the world. We were ahead of the curve. But other countries caught 
on. And in a 21st century economy that rewards knowledge like never before, we need to up our game. We need 
to do more. […] I want Americans to win the race for the kinds of discoveries that unleash new jobs.216 
 
The competition discourse where other countries are “catching on” serves as a nodal 
point to shape the world outside America as a relentless race, where there is no break from 
competing. The reference to the Golden Years of the 1950s and early 1960s in America is a 
theme that is frequently invoked in the “make America strong again” discourse. The 
effectiveness of this image is to transport the listener back to a sentimental state by invoking 
a time where America ruled supreme in the world economy, and social mobility seemed to be 
a fact of life. Moreover, this “things were better before” sentimental discourse constructs the 
implicit opposite: That something has gone wrong along the way.  
In many ways, a classroom can be seen as an arena for the reproduction of specific 
social worlds. These utilitarian approaches reinforce aspects of the free market business 
ontology where competition is the defining characteristic. To be sure, free tuition is a 
laudable and sensible policy from a normative standpoint. But, higher education is a very 
broad topic that allows the President to approach it from many angles. The choice of global 
competition is an angle which fits with the logic of the Obama Administration´s new trade 
deals. The free market liberal “education as competition” discourse therefore attempts to 
construct the kind of citizen that will thrive in this regime, and the kind of citizen that will 
not.  
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Despite the President´s rhetoric of the FTAs a blue-collar project, as well as numerous 
claims that manufacturing industry is moving back to America, “middle class” economics is 
marking the definitive shift away from Fordist conceptions of production, and emphasizes the 
role of America as a “knowledge economy”. This transition is by most indicators a practical 
fact in the American economy and is not controversial as such. MCE translates the pressures 
of the knowledge economy onto the education sector as a site of reproducing competitive 
discourses of the global economy. Through a critical analysis, the framework of a 
geopolitical contest in regards to education makes references to the FTAs, and that MCE is a 
project for America to outcompete its competitors more than fixing economic inequality and 
securing the middle class. One could almost say that American´s people are at fault for not 
being good enough in the global competition.  
The reforms in MCE consist of a very specific type of agenda that Robert Jessop has 
dubbed a “techno-economic” paradigm shift”, and this is apparent in the material selected.217 
The image of a dynamic and technologically savvy middle class is constructed through 
virtually material published from The White House, and in the President´s speeches. Thus the 
image of what people America needs is constructed through the President’s use of 
competition discourses. According to Foucault, all strategies that aim to emancipate and 
improve subjects can be seen as forms of liberal discipline.218 The Obama Administration is 
engaging in a very specific construction of the new American middle class as competitive, 
hard working citizens with global ambitions. The focus on global competition is the 
overarching theme of President Obama´s MCE policies. The new economic citizen is thus 
made aware that he is not competing for himself - he is competing for America. Even kids 
should share in the national ambitions of promoting American geopolitical power by being 
export-minded. This citizen is best able to succeed under a new free trading order. 
 
 
5.4 Making a Case for “Fair” Globalization 
 
As stated in the introduction this section sees the domestic part of MCE in conjunction with the 
proposed establishment of the new trade regime, as they are seen as coming from the same 
discursive formations. Thus the domestic aspect is important for what content these FTAs 
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regimes acquire. President Obama´s political discourse draws on classical liberal, conservative, 
and egalitarian elements to make a case for his reforms.  
The objective in this section is to analyze these elements against a backdrop of global 
competition, which has been hegemonic within the free market discursive terrain, and re-
contextualizing the subject to neutralize free market associations. The need to garner public 
support for these initiatives in a political climate where there is considerable public skepticism 
against further economic liberalization shapes President Obama’s discourse on these matters. 
As mentioned, the FTAs have attracted opposition among elements of the Democratic Party 
and labor leaders who are involved in the negotiations for fears are that the American workers 
will experience a lowering of their standards. In addition, the memory of the financial crisis is 
still fresh, thus anti big business and anti-Wall Street sentiment are very much factors that have 
been considered in the crafting of the presentations of the FTAs. While this could be seen as a 
strategical disadvantage for the President, the case that is presented in favor of the deals 
attempts to turn the free market skepticism to a rhetorical advantage. Anti-liberalization 
sentiments are addressed and neutralized by presenting the FTAs as a measure to increase 
order and justice, thus invoking a conservative political discourse amicable to the political 
Right, but at the same time applying these principles to the cheating of the financial sphere to 
cater to the adherents of welfare liberalism on the political Left. The abstract moral rationale 
for the free trade agreements are found in the 2015 Economic Report to the President: 
 
Bringing down our trading partners’ tariff and non-tariff barriers is essential for American firms to be able to 
compete on a level playing field in the global economy. The Administration’s policy is to encourage trade 
agreements to promote a “values-driven” trade regime that maximizes globalization’s benefits while addressing 
globalization’s problematic side-effects.219 
 
President Obama expresses the moral project in the Weekly Address on April 25, 2015: 
Today, I want to talk about why new trade deals are important to our values. 
They’re vital to middle-class economics -- the idea that this country does best when everyone gets their fair shot, 
everyone does their fair share, and everyone plays by the same set of rules. These are simple values. They’re 
American values. And we strive to make sure our own economy lives up to them, especially after a financial 
crisis brought about by recklessness and greed. But we also live in a world where our workers have to compete 
on a global scale. Right now, on an uneven playing field. Where the rules are different. And that’s why America 
has to write the rules of the global economy -- so that our workers can compete on a level playing field.220 
 
These samples include several kinds of discourse. The lexis that is used in relation to the 
trade deals is sports- or competition discourses. International trade is a game where 
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everybody should get a “fair shot”, and “play by the same set of rules”. The policies are 
presented as a need to “rewrite the rules” to compete on a “level playing field”. Sports 
discourse in politics is generally viewed as an effective way of creating a shared cultural 
identity.221 In U.S politics, the use of “baseball metaphors” by Presidents is by some seen as a 
way of communicating white masculinity, or appealing to white middle- and working class 
voters.222 This group is as such the main target audience the President has to convince to back 
his free trade initiatives.  
The moral constructions in these passages can be seen as expressions of greed talk; a 
cultural-moral line of discourses that has been often invoked in times of economic downturns 
in the United States, especially during the New Deal era like we saw in chapter 3. Such periods 
are conversely associated with the receding of discourses that celebrate unbridled material 
gain, as discourses of “acquisition” temporarily and spatially decline, giving way to more 
ascetic values.223 Seen in this dialectic, the stock market crash of 1929 was sufficiently 
dramatic to bring about near instant discursive hegemony to greed talk. The financial crisis 
has, arguably, produced more ambivalence than it has caused the downfall of the free 
acquisition hegemony. Nevertheless, it has been sufficiently wide felt to give new currency to 
“greed talk” and “anti-Wall Street” sentiments. Such an economic puncture like 2008 thus 
produces a moral event, which has generated a possible new understanding of what is 
acceptable and what is not in American society. According to Boltasnki & Chiapello, greed 
talk thus “constitutes a violation of norms of fairness and equity in a society of scarcity.”224 It 
represents indignation on the part of the “have-nots”, who feel cheated and thus claim moral 
superiority over the “haves”.  
Furthermore, an area of discursive antagonism that President Obama taps into for the 
purposes of selling the FTAs is the also morally based “producerist” discourse. Theorized by 
historian Michael Kazin, “producerist” discourse divides the population into two opposing 
camps: Those who are “productive”, and those who are “parasites”. In this dialectic, the 
government is often seen as dominated by a “leisure class”, to use Thorstein Veblen´s famous 
parlance, which are enriching themselves at the expense of the real workers.225 He saw that the 
working class were the producesr of value in society and the “leisure” elite class were 
unknowingly dependent on the productive work by others to sustain their hedonistic opulence. 
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Recently, this discourse has been the utilized by the American political Right to great effect, 
but in but in a complete inversion of Kazin and Veblen’s intention. In an alliance between free 
market fundamentalist and neoconservative discourses, the notion of the “job creator” has been 
peddled in American right wing media to describe the super-rich. In this relationship, the 
affluent are the real producers in the economy, and the poor are the parasites who, 
unknowingly, depend on the rich for their subsistence. This view on class-relations is clearly 
expressed in Ayn Rand’s 1957 novel Atlas Shrugged, a hallmark book in free market 
fundamentalist circles where the rich are, like Atlas in Greek mythology, figuratively  
supporting the weight of the world on their shoulders. FOX News has invoked this discourse 
frequently as a justification for the rejuvenation of what is tantamount to laissez-faire – 
colloquially called “rich-guy populism”.226 As part of President Obama’s strategy for the 
mobilization of working-class Americans is the re-contextualizing of this discourse away from 
the free market narrative. From the 2015 State of the Union Address:  
 
As Americans, we don’t mind paying our fair share of taxes as long as everybody else does, too. But for far too 
long, lobbyists have rigged the tax code with loopholes that let some corporations pay nothing while others pay 
full freight. They’ve riddled it with giveaways that the super-rich don’t need, while denying a break to middle-
class families who do.227 
 
Despite the aversion of American politicians to invoke the concept of class, such constructions 
as above implicitly invoke the structures of class conflict. For working class Americans, greed 
talk serves as discursive rallying point that builds class solidarity and moral superiority. This 
fact is used by the President to connect “greed talk” in usually the same paragraph as he talk 
about the FTAs – a subject that potentially goes against working class interests. Thus a moral 
case for FTAs is made also here. But as mentioned in the introduction, the middle class in 
America is not just a group defined by their income bracket, but a symbol of the American 
nation. Most of the American working class tends to see themselves as “middle class” or as 
“middle class bound”, but prevented form reaching the middle class by external factors. By 
alluding to Wall Street in the context of greed talk, agency is placed behind this externality that 
is keeping the middle-class, thus “America”, from being all that it can be. Wall Street has 
rigged the rules of the game and thus prevented the working class from ascending to the 
middle-class.  
Another strategy for building working class support is tapping into conservative 
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discourses of xenophobia and preserving American values. Anti-China discourse is a common 
theme in American politics to perform this function. “China” constitutes a way of defining the 
“other” to garner support among working class Americans, and at the same time define what is 
“American”. This is a logically sensitive issue since the loss of manufacturing jobs in America 
has been attributed to American initiatives of trade liberalization as well as competition from 
China in American political debates. Here Obama explain these developments as not the result 
of trade liberalization per se, but rather America is the victim of these past policies.  
 
If America doesn’t shape the rules of the global economy today, to benefit our workers, while our economy is in 
a position of new global strength, then China will write those rules. I’ve seen towns where manufacturing 
collapsed, plants closed down, and jobs dried up. And I refuse to accept that for our workers. Because I know 
when the playing field is level, nobody can beat us.228 
 
Here, the FTAs (represented as “America”) and “China” (represented as “the other”) appear in 
the same paragraph, but belonging different strings of moments. “America”: shape the rules; 
benefit our workers; new global strength. This can be contrasted with the string of negative 
moments: “China”: will write those rules; manufacturing collapsed; plants close down; jobs 
dried up. In Laclau and Mouffe´s terms, China functions as a moment in an “us-them” 
discourse. China thus represents the unfair - the cheater in the game - to which the necessary 
opposite is the U.S who always plays by the rules. The U.S is constructed as a standard-bearer, 
and the protector of its workers. It may be noted that China is transitioning through the 
institutional framework of the WTO that the U.S created, and that the rise of China has overall 
been considered very beneficial to the U.S and indeed the global economy. The FTAs are 
constructed as a policy to save American values that are being threatened by an outsider. By 
tapping into a moral discourse the President argues that the U.S is being exploited 
economically by China, and the need for this to stop immediately. The China card is effective 
for this, and it also serves to bring an element of urgency. 
 
In pursuing the FTAs, America becomes a representative for “fairness” in a global economy of 
cheaters. Fairness is thus constructed as the antagonistic counterpart to the pre-crisis economy. 
In addressing the economic structures at home, MCE is in fact aiming to redirect gains of the 
economy from the super-rich and towards a middle class. This is part of the President´s new 
tax code that will end the special privileges of wealthy interests. In contrast to free market 
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address-labor-day-lets-talk-about-budget Accessed September 05, 2015  
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discourses which key economic goal can be said hold that growth sine qua non; MCE is 
shifting the discourse over towards redistribution. In American politics, economic 
redistribution talk is often connected with political peril, as the idea of “equal opportunity” 
rather than equality of “outcome” is a broad culturally accepted qualifier in relation to social 
mobility and the “American Dream”. In addition, fairness is a term that has strong Democratic 
Party connotations from being frequently invoked during the New Deal and Lyndon Johnson´s 
Great Society programs. Political analysts have concluded that the term is not suitable for 
building bipartisan support.229 Wary of this, President Obama approaches these subjects with a 
combination of “greed” discourse thus attempting to fill the fluid signifiers of free market 
discourse. For example, the term opportunity can bridge this partisan gap although it has been 
traditionally appropriated as a definite sign in free market discourses. One might think this 
would seem to directly challenge free market hegemony by intervening in the market. 
However, Obama is drawing from within the free market discourse, in order to re-contextualize 
the fluid signifiers fairness and opportunity, and set opportunity in a nodal relationship with 
“middle class economics”. This aims at core values of the free market culture, which is 
political intervention in the market processes to achieve economic redistribution – one of the 
strongest nodal points of free maket discourse.  
In Obama´s 2015 State of the Union the word opportunity appears ten times. The term usually 
functions as a fluid signifier that avoids a discourse of economic redistribution directly, and 
instead grants access to the market: “So the verdict is clear. Middle-class economics 
works. Expanding opportunity works.”230 
 
This part of MCE taps into a central discourse from classical political liberalism, which 
resonates well in American culture by framing the tax increases on the super-rich as equality of 
opportunity, and not equality of outcome. Opportunity, as a fluid sign, is non-antagonistic in 
the sense that it is limitless: Every American wants more of it. Linked to economic or political 
goals, opportunity works. Moreover, the term fair as used to describe a market that is well 
functioning: “That’s what middle-class economics is -- the idea that this country does best 
when everyone gets their fair shot, everyone does their fair share, everyone plays by the same 
set of rules.” The use of the term fair or fairness is used repeatedly, but not to challenge the 
workings of the market. Instead, it is used in support of the market. Words like fairness and 
level playing field in this context serve to highlight the current arrangements are unjust. In 
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addition, the Economic report of 2015 advises the President to present the FTAs as measures 
of financial regulation that will prevent another financial crisis: 
 
Deeper coordination does eventually seem to happen when minds become concentrated on the brink of disaster. 
But that is not enough and it has been harder to sustain cooperative momentum in periods of calm. Yet it is 
precisely in periods of calm when the investments and preparation for the next crisis need to occur. It is critical 
to maintain the pressure for financial reform while the memory of the last financial crisis is still fresh.231 
 
In the context of MCE, the vocabulary of trade liberalization becomes consistent with 
the rest of the MCE program on the basis of its shared “values”. MCE is presented as building 
up a regulatory regime that will be stop the abuses that are taking place, which are putting the 
U.S at a disadvantage. Unlike the market rationality of the unbridled market which contended 
that the state had no role in the economy, the Obama Administration sees the American state as 
a guarantor that globalization is fair and to the advantage of American workers. The policy 
initiatives of MCE and the FTAs are presented together as a program of advancing American 
values in the global economy, and the window of opportunity for doing so is closing so this has 
to be seized upon.  
 
 
6.0 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has endeavored to show MCE as more than presidential rhetoric and indeed more 
than the sum of its policies. This thesis therefore concludes with the assumption that the 
laissez-faire liberalism as an intellectual project is challenged at the highest level of American 
politics by Obama´s Middle Class Economics. Therefore, we are arguably seeing the shifts in 
the economic discourse in the United States that I claimed in chapter one.  
In analyzing the discourses from the White House, MCE has identified a set of 
problems that reveal a deeper understanding of the social nature of the economy and the need 
for the state to consider the social dimensions of economic performance. This may indicate that 
economic policy at the top level in the USA has ceased to be informed by “trickle down” and 
supply side discourses of free market economics. A shift in ideas has taken place.  
Free market economists are not vanquished from policymaking, but they are no longer 
articulating and driving economic policy in the United States. True, the free-market forces in 
America have frustrated the efforts of President Obama regulate the economy. However, the 
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severity of the structural problems of the American economy and the ambitions of MCE 
imply that the state has to intervene in the economy in ways that are more profound than those 
prescribed by free market advocates in the USA currently. 
 
Viewed as a whole, pushing the MCE and a free trade regime that seeks to make many 
of the values and policies of MCE as the standard for a sweeping set of free trade agreements is 
a herculean task for the Obama Administration. Even the partial realization of this project 
would amount to a significant departure from today´s free market structures, both in terms of 
the domestic political-economic structures of the USA and the global economy.  
 
As we saw in the 2015 Report to the President, the Obama Administration recognizes that free 
market discourses are on the retreat. The decision to pursue MCE and financial regulations 
while “the memory of the financial crisis is still fresh” indicates that this window might be 
closing. Indeed, by many accounts, the free market forces are considered stronger after the 
crisis. In structural terms this might be the case, but in the field of ideas, this is not the case as 
this thesis shows.  
But, considering the relatively protracted nature of the dialectics of free market 
economics and welfare liberalism in chapter 3, we can perhaps say that MCE is the first word 
and not the last in the unraveling of a greater hegemonic transition away from free market 
dominance. For Keynesian welfare liberalism, the institutional cracks appeared in the early 
seventies, but the entire process for structural change took a decade with numerous attempts to 
salvage the Keynesian system. Indeed, as chapter 3 illustrates and Fairclough´s model on 
hegemonic discourses in chapter 2 tell us, institutional change begins with ideas. As Norman 
Fairclough states, discourses tend to "lead" the way for social change. Arguably, this current 
transition away from laissez-faire has yet to play out in full. Thus, the protracted ambivalence 
of the current U.S economy may yet continue to mystify observers. 
We can perhaps deduce that MCE is the start of the U.S transitioning to a more welfare 
oriented and brand of economics where the state is indeed “back”, albeit in a lighter and more 
market oriented form than the Keynesian welfare state?  
However, one crucial difference is that the economic structures that supported the Keynesian 
welfare state were gradually dismantled in the wake of the return of laissez-faire. Such a 
structural transformation of the American economy has not materialized after the financial 
crisis, yet.  
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One aim of this thesis is to demonstrate how President Obama represents and promotes a new 
economic discourse in America that results in the construction of a particular new kind of 
middle class in the U.S that differs from previous free market individualism. This “new middle 
class” is constructed, among other elements, through a moral-economic discourse. This can be 
seen as part of a desire by Obama to mitigate adverse social effects in the context of further 
economic liberalization of the global economy by encouraging the formation of social capital. 
The result is what we can call free market liberalism with “a human face”, or “individualism 
properly understood” as coined by Tocqueville. Social capital here can be seen as keeping the 
more adverse social aspects of the free market in check.  
 
Although the results and details of the negotiations of these deals are yet to be revealed, it 
seems like MCE is partly overshadowed by the geopolitical concerns of the FTAs. The task to 
make economic globalization more sustainable and mitigate adverse social downsides is 
clearly a monumental task. In part, it can seem like the presentation of MCE is dominated by 
efforts to legitimize the trade deals in Obama´s making. Obama thus appears as a broker of a 
two-sided deal: If the American middle class is to receive the new benefits from the state, they 
must go along with the trade deals. The lack of political discourse in modern economics is 
striking. MCE, attempts to democratize the economic debate by offering social protections in 
one end, while advancing the corporate agenda in the other. As a “new subject”, recognition in 
the MCE is conditional on getting on with the changes in the global economy 
 
As we saw in chapter 3, one of the reasons for laissez-faire´s political success in America has 
been its ability to link its discourses to classical political liberalism, which is part of America´s 
founding. Therefore, the challenge of Obama has been one of demonstrating the illiberal 
outcomes of unfettered market economics. In MCE, and under his Presidency as a whole, 
Obama constructs a moral case for his plan for the middle class that has successfully 
challenged free market discourses in certain areas. This tells us something about the success of 
the return of laissez-faire.  
 
I have shown in chapter three that the era of laissez-faire was sustainable on the basis if the 
hegemonic discourses it created, which underwrote its social purpose, or rather, legitimized the 
fact that it didn´t need one. It created a discourse of non-responsibility and non-agency, 
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encouraged Marxist and other protests that the state was just another weapon in the arsenal of 
the capitalist class. The New Deal created in a new mentality towards liberal economic 
governance in America that ushered in a period where the state assumes a self-reflexive role. 
The state, armed with the concepts and perspectives of Keynes could play a role as a third 
party in the economy that mediated the tensions between the market and the citizen. This 
brought about a discourse that identified the public as political beings in the sense that certain 
economic rights as American citizens.  
 
Given the current information available on TPP, TISA, and TTIP it is too early to render 
the final verdict on these matters. It is certain, however, that the core of this project is private 
and not political. To the extent it renders political autonomy for interpretation of the 
governments that are to be included under its aegis is uncertain, but the information so far 
seems to indicate a continuation of economic globalization where large corporations are 
driving and articulation the policies, largely out of the purview of democratic institutions.  
However intelligent its design may be, the process by which it has been implemented 
renders it a very weak product in a political sense. Nevertheless, if we are to assess the project 
in bona fide, and disregard empirical evidence on previous trade deals, perhaps the picture is 
not so bleak after all. If the underlying values of such a project recognize, as its stated, the 
problematic aspects of globalization, and the social tensions that arise from markets, this can 
constitute progress from the current arrangements. If middle class economics were to become a 
global liberal order with the institutional and moral wherewithal to enact its intensions, then 
intelligent design from above is perhaps the only way. Bretton Woods, the “glorious 
compromise” of embedded liberalism was, after all, as top-down as it could get. Should one 
therefore worry about process so long as the underlying values are good?  
 
 
In a fundamental sense, the difference between Keynesianism and the unfettered market is 
one of accountability. Keynesianism provided democratic responsibility for the economy. 
This occurred in two ways: First, those with the most important levers in the economy were 
politicians, or under some control from elected officials.  
Second, the acknowledgement of the social goals of the economy meant that the U.S 
government could assume responsibility for poverty problems, if only in discursive terms and 
not material terms. Springing form the inherent logic of Keynesianism was the fact that the 
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economy had a consciousness, or a “self-reflexivity” as Jaqueline Best, put it. As such, the 
notion of “embedded liberalism” is a useful term. It highlights that the Keynesian economy 
was discursive in a political sense that its free market counterpart was not. Poverty, (or 
absolute economic inequality, to use a more analytical term) was at least a partial government 
responsibility under the Keynesian welfare state. Under the free market, poverty is solely an 
individual responsibility, thus turning a blind eye to the structural nature of the economy. The 
same goes for relative economic inequality, which is another form of deprivation. 
Considering the developments described in America in chapter 3, it is possible to claim that 
the threshold for political and social protest is lower under Keynesianism than under the free 
market simply because of the presence of political accountability in the welfare state. Or put 
another way, is having a welfare state simply too demanding politically in the USA? It took a 
once in a century Depression to end the free market laissez-faire idea, but it took a mild 
recession, comparably, in the 1970s to scrap the notion of government at the economic helm. 
MCE as such, seen in the American context, is perhaps a good deal at the moment. The notion 
of American citizens’ economic rights to welfare will perhaps not be restored to the 
Keynesian period for quite some time. MCE is thus a policy to introduce some welfare, which 
may be considered quite generous under the prevailing circumstances. When we look at the 
rest of the western world, this is actually going against the current. Ironically, many European 
countries as a means to economic recovery are pursuing austerity - to great detrimental effect. 
As the U.S is discovering that it can no longer afford to ignore welfare as a component of 
modern economy, European countries cannot afford it.   
 
I stated in the foreword that I hoped to discover MCE as evidence of a departure from the free 
market mindset that has made the U.S a chief sponsor of a global brand of reckless finance-
capitalism. I must say that if we are to have new global liberal order, some of the content that 
is being described might very well be a good start.  
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